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I. INTRODUCTION 
The emergency power system (EPS) for a typical pressurized water 
reactor (PWR) power generating facility is designed to supply power to the 
reactor protection system (RPS) for safe shutdown. It also provides power 
for the engineered safety features (ESF) system that is intended to miti­
gate the consequences of transients (anticipated or unanticipated) or 
accidents. The EPS consists of: 1) offsite ac power (thé preferred 
source), 2) onsite ac power (the standby source), 3) dc power, and 
4) auxiliary equipment for the distribution of power to the ESF loads. 
A hypothetical sequence of events associated with the EPS had been 
identified in the Reactor Safety Study (RSS) to be a major contributor of 
risk for a core meltdown accident [1]. This sequence of events involves 
a loss of offsite power (LOSP) during a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), 
compounded by failure of the emergency onsite power supply and auxiliary 
feedwater delivery. Whether this postulated scenario (referred to as the 
TMLB' sequence in the RSS) may or may not be a major risk contributor 
during routine operating conditions, it represents one of the most severe 
challenges for any nuclear power plant. 
The onsite power system (i.e.,the emergency diesel generators) should 
assume the full ESF loads within thirty (30) seconds after a LOSP coinci­
dent with a large LOCA. This capability is significant in retarding the 
progression of this sequence of events and in mitigating the effects of 
a probable core meltdown. If there is a total loss of electrical power 
supply to the ESF system for about an hour after a LOCA, core cooling 
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gradually declines. Hence, a systematic reliability analysis of the EPS is 
important in the optimal design of the electrical power distribution system 
in a commercial nuclear power plant. In particular, the availability of 
redundant diesel generators should be investigated for its impact on 
avoiding or reducing the effects of the postulated core meltdown sequence. 
This dissertaion examines the reliability of the EPS and its impact 
on overall plant safety using probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) tech­
niques. The analysis is performed using the reliability block diagram 
(RED) model and fault tree logic in PRA methodology. This provides a 
comprehensive approach to the quantitative and qualitative assessment of 
system reliability. The RED model represents the active elements of a 
system in "supercomponent trains" which permit the identification of 
system-success pathways for reliability prediction. The fault tree process 
is a powerful tool for analyzing the possible mechanisms for failure of 
system functions including human interactions and initial system parameters 
in addition to multiple component failures. The RED adds clarity to the 
quantification of the fault tree in estimating overall system availability. 
The course of a postulated accident is analyzed by event tree method­
ology to complement the PRA effort. The event tree identifies the 
possible outcomes of a given initiating event. It provides a useful 
structure for probabilistic analysis and quantifying the probability of 
transient events [2]. To analyze the influence of human control over 
the outcomes of an evenC initiator, a functional event tree such as the 
"operator action" event tree (OAET) is used to address the unique role of 
the individual in mitigating the consequences of a significant event. 
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Finally, the unavailability of the EPS represents a common cause 
failure of great importance in the operational design of the electrical 
power distribution system of a nuclear power plant. Enhanced system re­
liability contributes to improvement in overall plant availability. The 
successful automatic responses to a LOSP initiator and the relevant 
operator actions to retard the progression of undesirable plant condi­
tions result in overall increased safety during routine operations. 
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II. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The Reactor Safety Study (RSS) identified the anticipated transient 
involving loss of offsite power (LOSP) as a potential major contributor 
of risk for the pressurized water reactor (PWR) power plant that was 
under investigation [1]. It was estimated that LOSP occurs about ten 
(10) times per year per reactor [1, 3]. In addition, the evaluation of 
risks from this particular accident scenario, using the CORRAL computer 
code, indicates that this sequence of events is a significant contributor 
to PWR containment releases [3]. The CORRAL code estimates the magnitude 
of radioactivity released to the atmosphere [3]. 
The total loss of power on the offsite electrical grid can be caused 
by a main generator outage due to an abnormal plant transient, or by 
external events such a lightning, tornadoes, storms and fire. The auto­
matic responses to the LOSP initiator include trips of: the reactor 
(scram), the reactor coolant pumps, the main turbine, the main feedwater 
pumps and the circulating water pumps. Emergency feedwater is delivered 
to the steam generators by the turbine-driven emergency feedwater pump 
when low steam generator water level is reached. The standby diesel 
generators are automatically started to begin their designated loading 
sequence. The two motor-driven emergency feedwater pumps will have been 
sequenced to provide additional emergency feedwater flow. Decay heat is 
removed by steam relief from the steam generators. Primary coolant in­
ventory and pressure are controlled by the charging pumps (or high pres­
sure safety injection flow) and pressurizer heaters. 
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The RSS analyzed the various individual accident paths having the 
potential to cause core degradation, but it did not adequately address 
the safety problem that can arise when faults in one system cause failure 
of an interrelated or entirely different system. While human error was 
treated as a unique contributor to system failures, there was insufficient 
attention to correlated or sequential operator faults. In the PRA effort, 
the RSS also did not account for design errors [4]. 
The TMI-2 (Three-Mile Island-2) incident has supported justification 
of regulatory requirements for supplementary quantitative reliability 
analysis plus the evaluation of consequences of system failure [5]. The 
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) considers that better 
data are necessary to evaluate the validity of quantitative results from 
the RSS in absolute terms [4]. The probabilistic evaluation of the full 
accident spectrum provides quantitative risk criteria that can be 
employed judiciously in the nuclear licensing process. Quantitative risk 
assessment is an important input into the decision-making process regard­
ing acceptability for other technologies. 
Based on these considerations, the principal objectives of this 
dissertation are to: 
1. Evaluate the reliability, using a reliability block diagram 
model, of the emergency power system to perform its desired 
mission. 
2. Analyze the fault tree constructed for the emergency power 
system to yield an assessment of overall system availability. 
The quantitative evaluation of system availability is based on 
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updated failure rate.estimations of multiple components, 
operator interactions and common mode failures associated with 
the emergency power system. 
3. Identify the response of the principal nuclear reactor plant 
systems to the anticipated transient using the event tree 
methodology and address the role of the operator in the miti­
gation of the transient. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Reactor Safety Study (RSS) was a risk assessment of commercial 
nuclear power plants that was based on the definition of dependencies 
between and among safety functions and the engineered safety feature (ESF) 
systems [1]. It categorized various hypothetical accidents and identified 
potential weak links for two types of nuclear power plants: the pres­
surized water reactor (PWR) and the boiling water reactor (BWR) designs. 
By incorporating human error, test and maintenance, and common cause con­
tributions to system unavailabilities, the study shows the relationship 
of core melt to containment failure modes that result from system failures. 
An important result of the RSS was that, although the probability of 
a core meltdown accident was very low, the consequences to the public 
could be significant. The RSS determined that small loss-of-coolant acci­
dent (LOCA) sequences and non-LOCA transients are significant contributors 
to the predicted frequency of core melt for the PWR [3]. The study as­
sumed, very pessimistically, that a core degradation sequence continued 
inexorably to its conclusion. 
A major risk contributor for the PWR investigated in the RSS was a 
sequence of events involving a loss of offsite power (LOSP) during a LOCA, 
coincident with failure of emergency onsite power supply and auxiliary 
feedwater delivery. The sequence of events results in total loss of 
available ac power to the ESF systems because the LOCA induces a main 
generator outage. This scenario may be one of the most severe challenges 
for any nuclear power plant. 
8 
It was estimated that LOSP occurs about ten times per year per re­
actor [3]. However, a recent assessment of "station blackout" based on 
information from Licensee Event Reports (LER) indicates that the proba­
bility of LOSP is higher for some commercial nuclear power plants [6], 
Site-specific investigations reveal that the frequency of LOSP varies for 
different locales. Regardless of the random occurrence of LOSP, the 
reliability of the emergency power system (EPS) to perform its mission 
has to be adequately analyzed to assess the safety implications of this 
anticipated transient. Vesely [7] pointed out that risk analysis must be 
performed in conjunction with data analysis to provide pertinent relia­
bility and safety information for decision-making in the nuclear licensing 
process. 
The availability of the emergency onsite power supply to the ESF 
loads within thirty (30) seconds after LOSP is essential to mitigate the 
progression and consequences of a core melt initiated by this transient. 
Chu and Gaver [8] derived and evaluated the long-term system availability 
of single-unit and triple-unit standby systems by stochastic process 
methods that involved a linking of two Markov processes. The optimum 
inspection interval for enhanced system availability was examined. Pages 
et al. [9] evaluated the reliability and availability of large repairable 
systems by the method of critical running states. Azarm et al. [10] 
showed that availability of the emergency onsite power system can be esti­
mated by dynamic Markov modeling techniques. Vaurio [11] developed com­
prehensive availability models for analyzing redundant standby safety 
systems. These models provide techniques for obtaining optimum test 
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intervals for improvement in system availability. Mankamo and Pulkkinen 
[12] established that the availability of the emergency power system, 
-viz., the diesel generators, depends on the test intervals. 
Since the dc power supply is an integral part of the EPS, the nuclear 
power plant is required to enter into a shutdown mode when there is a 
failure of one dc bus in the plant electrical distribution system. It 
was postulated that the sudden gross failure of redundant dc power 
supplies during normal plant operation could lead to insufficient shut­
down cooling of the reactor core. Eisenhut [13] utilized a probabilistic 
approach to evaluate the reliability of dc power supplies in a nuclear 
power plant. The study concluded that the likelihood of dc power supply 
failures leading to insufficient shutdown cooling of the reactor core was 
**6 
sufficiently small (<10 per reactor year) so that no further considera­
tion was required. Even though the failure of dc power supplies repre­
sented a small contribution to the probability of a core-melt accident, 
dc power-dependent failures involving decay heat removal system and 
reactor coolant system integrity are nevertheless potentially significant 
for certain plant designs [14]. 
In the quantified reliability analysis of a complex system such as 
the EPS, common mode failures (CMF) or common cause failures (CCF) can be 
a significant and difficult aspect. Fleming and Raabe [15] compared 
three methods to predict the reliability characteristics of redundant 
systems subject to independent and common cause failures. Markov model­
ing showed that the beta factor statistics used in the High Temperature 
Gas-Cooled Reactor risk assessment study was consistent with the Marshall-
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Olkin approach based on the multivariate exponential distribution. The 
reliability for diesel generator startup as calculated by the beta factor 
statistics was consistent with the result from the geometric mean approach 
used in the RSS. Easterling [16] had attempted to define CMF or CCF by a 
probability model dealing with dependence among failure events, dependence 
of failure events on the conditions under which an item is designed to 
perform, and dependence among these conditions. The probability model was 
used to investigate the adequacy of bounds on the probability of multiple 
failures. Steverson and Atwood [17] used the binomial distribution model 
to estimate the common cause failure rates for diesel generators in nuclear 
power plants based on LERs from 1976 to 1978. However, plant-to-plant 
variations complicate the calculation of these estimates. Common mode 
failures of redundant elements in the design of nuclear systems have been 
a major concern to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) 
over the years [4]. This concern had guided the ACRS to recommend appro­
priate modifications of nuclear plant designs to account for systematic 
(common mode or common cause) failures. 
The Three Mile Island-2 accident showed that inadequate attention in 
design, analysis and operations may have been given to complex transients, 
small LOCAs and reliable decay heat removal [5]. The accident demon­
strated the importance of comprehensive analyses of strategies or options 
so as to preclude initiation of transients and to avoid consequences that 
may lead to core melt. The response of a PWR to a hypothetical meltdown 
sequence initiated by loss of offsite and onsite power and auxiliary feed-
water had been qualitatively analyzed by Haskin et al. [18]. The core 
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meltdown, containment response and consequences to the public have been 
dealt with in a deterministic manner. However, the probability of the 
accident occurring was not computed and the risks associated with the 
plant response were not quantified. 
The overall system safety and performance in nuclear power plants 
can be improved by using probabilistic methodology to search for potential 
weak points in the designs of nuclear generating stations in operation or 
under construction. Fussell.et al. [19] outlined a computer-aided method­
ology to determine the relative contributions of various subsystems and 
components to the total risk associated with an engineered system. The 
major contributors to system risk were identified through comparison of 
expected frequency distribution functions with an established risk 
criterion. The critical subsystems, components and failure modes that 
affect plant availability can be identified. However, this also requires 
an overall system knowledge and the engineering judgment to examine the 
basic system operation in a critical manner [20]. 
Finally, other risk analyses of light water reactor plants are 
continuously being performed to examine the full spectrum of accident 
initiators. The German Risk Study is quantitatively evaluating the con­
tributions of additional initiating events that had not been considered 
in the RSS [21]. 
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IV. RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
All systems eventually fail because nothing is perfectly reliable. 
System failure can occur in many ways, and it involves single or multiple 
component failures. The degradation of a multicomponent system can be 
properly assessed from the reliability of its components to perform their 
desired missions. 
The probability density for failure of a component can be described 
by a function f(t). The cumulative probability for failure, F(t), is 
related to the probability density for failure by the equation , [3, 22] 
For systems in continuous operation, the failure intensity rate (or 
hazard rate) is defined by [3, 23] 
0 
(4.1) 
Differentiating with respect to t, 
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
Substituting Eq. 4.2 into Eq. 4.3., 
dY tin [1 - F(t)]} (4.4) 
Integrating with respect to t. 
0 
(4.5) 
13 
Therefore, 
1 - F(t) = exp [ - f  X(t) dt] (4.6) 
^0 
Reliability R(t) is the probability that a system performs a speci­
fied function or mission under given conditions for a prescribed time. 
It defines the probability that a system or device will not fail during a 
time period t [3]. Hence, it is the complementary probability to F(t), 
i.e., 
R(t) = 1 - F(t) (4.7) 
From Eq. 4.6, 
R(t) = exp X(t) dt] (4.8) 
Assuming that failures are uniformly random events that are mutually 
independent, the failure intensity rate becomes constant such that [3] 
X(t) = X (4.9) 
If the components in a system have random failure rates, then the ith 
component reliability is simply 
R^(t) = &~^±^ (4.10) 
A. System Reliability Block Diagram 
System reliability can be predicted by the representation of the 
active components in a reliability block diagram (RED) that portrays the 
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successful pathway of system functions or operation. The RBD is a model 
of statistically independent components that operate in series or in 
active-parallel. It is generated by an inductive process that identifies 
all pathways for system success. 
A series configuration of N components in a system is shown in 
Figure 1. If each of the N independent units has reliability R^, the 
reliability of the system structure is described by the general equation 
[3. 23] 
N 
R.(t) = n R^(t) (4.11) 
® n=l " 
If each component exhibits a constant hazard, then 
N N 
R (t) = n e n = exp [- Z X t] (4.12) 
® n=l n=l " 
If a system of n components can function properly when only one of the 
components is operable, a parallel configuration is indicated. A parallel 
configuration of N components is shown in Figure 2. The reliability 
function for an active-parallel system is generally expressed as [3, 23] 
N 
R^(t) = 1 - [1 - R„(t)] (4.13) 
P n=l 
Reliability block diagrams have been used in the probabilistic risk 
assessment of nuclear plants to facilitate the quantification of system 
fault trees. 
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1 2 «,(:) 
Figure 1. Series configuration in a reliability block diagram 
1 
2 
1^2 
I 
1 
I 
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I 
1 
1 1 
N 
-Ep(t) 
Figure 2. Parallel configuration in a reliability block diagram 
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B. System Availability 
The system instantaneous availability A(t) is the probability that a 
system performs a specified function or mission under given conditions at 
a prescribed time. The probability 1 - A(t) is termed the instantaneous 
unavailability. The instantaneous availability is bounded such that 
R(t) < A(t) < 1 (4.14) 
For a nonrepairable system, the system unreliability or unavailability is 
q [3 ] :  
q = 1 - R(t) 
= 1 - e (4.14) 
where X is the constant hazard rate for a device that experiences random 
failures and T is the mission time of interest. For small values of XT 
(< 0.1), the system unavailability, q is approximated such that [1, 3] 
q = XT (4.16) 
The overall system unavailability can be computed from a system fault 
tree that analyzes the possible mechanisms of failure. The failure 
mechanisms in a system are logically represented as fault events on the 
fault tree structure. The fault events are pictorially combined to show 
their causal relationships to an undesired (top) event. Since unavail­
ability is the probability of being in a failed state at any given time, 
the occurrence probability of a basic fault event represents the unavail­
ability of a system component with a constant failure rate [1]. There­
17 
fore, system unavailability can be evaluated from a quantitative assess­
ment of a fault tree. 
C. Fault Tree Process 
Quantitative analysis of the fault tree consists of transforming its 
established logical structure into an equivalent form and numerically 
calculating the occurrence probability of the top event from the occur­
rence probabilities of the basic events. The occurrence probability of 
the top event can be evaluated by the solution of Boolean algebraic 
equations for the gates of the system fault tree. For each gate of the 
tree, the input events (such as the primary events) are the independent 
variables, and the output event (such as the intermediate event) is the 
dependent variable. The probability of the output event can be computed 
by applying the Boolean expressions to the basic gates, AND gate and OR 
gate, of the tree. 
For n inputs to the AND gate, the probability of the top event is 
expressed by the equation [3] 
PCA^Ag Ajj) = P(Ap P(A2) P(Ajj) (4.17) 
In the case of the OR gate with n inputs, the probability expression for 
the top event is given by [3] 
N N-1 N 
P(A,+A„+ +A.,) = S P(A ) - Z Z P(A A ) + ••• 
^ ^ ^ n=l " n=l m=n+l " ™ 
+ (-1)^"^ PCAiAg-'-A^) (4.18) 
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Since the basic event probabilities, P(A^), are normally very small, the 
Boolean expression for the OR gate with n statistically independent inputs 
is often represented by the approximation [3] 
N 
P(A^+A2+"'+Ajj) = Z P(A^) (4.19) 
n=l 
The resulting probability from each calculation for a logic gate is used 
as an input to the calculation of the event corresponding to the next 
gate higher in the fault tree. In this manner, the probability of the 
top event can be quantified in terms of the minimum number of basic 
events from the bottom to the top of the tree. 
Table 1 shows the symbols commonly used in the construction of a 
fault tree. Figure 3 shows the Boolean operation involved in the quanti­
fication of a typical fault tree. Table 2 provides the specifications 
for this fault tree. 
For the typical fault tree example, the primary fault events, B, C, 
D and E are inputs to the OR gates T^ and T^. The inputs to the AND gate 
Tg are the intermediate fault events Tg and T^. The top event T^ is an 
OR gate combination of primary event A and the intermediate fault event 
Tg. Hence, the probability of the top event is computed as 
P(Tp = P(A) + PCTg) (4.20) 
where 
PfTg) = PCTg) • P(T^) 
P(T3) = P(B) + P(C) 
P(T^) = P(D) + P(E) 
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Table 1. Common fault tree symbols 
Symbol Name Description 
Ô 
Rectangle 
Circle 
Fault event; it is usually the result 
of the logical combination of other 
events 
Independent primary fault event. 
A 
Ô 
Û 
À 
Diamond 
House 
OR Gate 
AND Gate 
INHIBIT Gate 
Triangle-In 
Triangle-out 
Fault event not fully developed as to 
its causes; it is only an assumed 
primary fault event. 
Normally occurring basic event; it is 
not a fault event. 
The union operation of events; i.e., 
the output event occurs if one or more 
of the Inputs occur. 
The intersection operation of events; 
i.e., the output event occurs if and 
only if all the inputs occur. 
Output exists when X exists and condi­
tion A is present; this gate functions 
somewhat like an AND gate and is used 
for a secondary fault event X. 
Triangle symbols transfer the tree 
construction from one sheet to the 
next. The triangle-in appears at the 
bottom of a tree and represents that 
branch of the tree ("A") shown some­
place else. The triangle-out appears 
at the top of a tree and denotes that 
the tree "A" is a subtree to one shown 
someplace else. 
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Top Event 
Tz = T3.T4 
T3 = B + C 
T^ = D + E 
Figure 3. Boolean process for quantification of a fault tree 
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Table 2. Specifications for the typical fault tree 
Gate Type Inputs 
T^ OR A, Tg 
Tg AND T3, T^ 
T^ OR B, C 
T^ OR D, E 
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D. Event Tree 
A fault tree analysis Is used to calculate the conditional probabil-
ilities needed for each branch of an event tree that identifies the 
various outcomes of a given initiating event. Any path from the initi­
ating event to a final outcome is called an accident sequence. The event 
tree facilitates the systematic description of possible success and 
failure states that evolve from an event initiator. In an event tree, 
either systems or functions can serve as event-tree headings that repre­
sent the possibilities or strategies to mitigate the consequences of the 
initiator. A simple event tree is illustrated in Figure 4. 
A type of functional event tree is the "operator action" event tree 
(OAET). The OAET incorporates human reliability analysis at the system 
event-tree level in modeling the response to a transient. It addresses 
the unique role of the operator in the actions to mitigate the effects of 
an undesirable event. The identification of automatic responses to an 
initiator in the OAET provides valuable information for the correct 
diagnosis and interpretation of key symptoms in accident initiation and 
progression analysis (AIPA). 
E. Summary 
The quantitative assessment techniques presented above is applied to 
the evaluation of the reliability of the emergency power system described 
in the following section. The major active components in the electrical 
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Initiating Event System 1 System 2 
Success State 
Success State (5%) 
(Si) Failure State 
Initiating Event 
(I) Success State 
Failure State (Sj) 
(Fp Failure State 
Accident Sequences 
(F,) 
S1S2 
S^F2 
Figure 4. A simple event tree 
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power distribution system that operate during normal plant operation are 
independent units whose individual random failure may affect the total 
system reliability. Since the components have constant failure rates, 
system unreliability from hardware failures only can be effectively 
analyzed by a RBD model. The RBD method structures the various devices 
in series into "supercomponent trains" and then links together the 
parallel supercomponents to form a summary model of the system design. 
The quantitative assessment of system reliability then involves the ap­
plication of the appropriate general reliability equations for the series 
or active-parallel configurations in the RBD. 
During normal plant operation, there may be off-normal events that 
interact to produce other events to cause system unavailability. The 
possible combinations of fault events associated with the mission of the 
emergency power system can be analyzed by fault tree methodology. The 
fault tree analysis includes human interactions and initial system condi­
tions in addition to hardware failures. Using updated failure data for 
the basic events that result in the occurrence of the undesired event, 
i.e., insufficient power to the 4.16-kV engineered safety feature bus, 
the quantitative evaluation of system unavailability is performed. 
An abnormal event such as loss of offsite power affects the avail­
ability of the emergency power system in a nuclear power plant to provide 
adequate power to the engineered safety systems. The progression of this 
event and the automatic plant responses can be investigated by an event 
tree. The influence of human actions to mitigate the consequences of the 
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transient event is addressed in the OAET. This methodology provides the 
structure for probabilistic analysis of human factors in the event. 
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V. THE ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM 
Electrical power is required for the normal operation of the various 
systems in a nuclear power plant. These systems generally consist of the 
Nuclear Steam Supply system and the Balance of the Plant system. The 
electrical power distribution system in the nuclear power facility should 
provide a means for the reliable supply of power to all components in the 
systems. The distribution network supplies power from dependable sources 
to the equipment that must be energized for startup, normal operation and 
shutdown of the plant. The design of a plant electrical power distribu­
tion system includes an onsite ac power source as well as an external 
power source to enhance the reliability of power supply to the various 
plant loads. 
In a typical nuclear power plant, the power sources' are physically 
and electrically isolated to the maximum extent so that any single failure 
will affect only one source of supply. Since a reliable power supply is 
vital for operation of the plant systems, total loss of ac power from all 
supply sources (station blackout) has a direct impact upon the plant oper­
ational safety. Furthermore, a station blackout results in a sudden loss 
of nuclear electrical generation. Therefore, the occurrence of total 
station blackout must be minimized. 
The basic components in the electrical power distribution system are 
a main generator, main transformers, unit auxiliary transformers, startup 
transformers, station service transformers and dc power sources. These 
devices are all directly connected in a unique configuration to provide 
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reliable service to the plant loads. Standby diesel generators supply 
emergency power in the event of a complete loss of normal external ac 
power. 
Figure 5 shows a simplified one-line diagram of the electrical power 
distribution system for a typical 1100 MW(e) pressurized water reactor 
power plant of the Combustion Engineering design. The bus designations in 
the electrical distribution system are provided in Table 3. 
Table 3. Bus designations in the electrical power distribution system 
Voltage Buses 
6.9 kV lA, IB 
4.16 kV (Nonsafety) 2A, 2B, 4A, 4B 
4.16 kV (Safety) 3AS, 3BS, 3ABS 
480 V (Nonsafety) 21A, 21B, 22A, 22B, 32A, 32B 
480 V (Safety) 31AS, 31BS, 31ABS 
The electrical power system for this particular nuclear generating 
station (Waterford 3) consists of an onsite ac power system and dc power 
system [24, 25]. The ac power system provides electrical energy to 
operate the mechanical equipment in the plant systems. The dc power 
system provides uninterruptible 125-V dc power for instrumentation and 
control systems. 
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A. Onsite ac Power 
The onsite ac power distribution system consists of two redundant, 
and basically independent trains, Train A and Train B. Each train is a 
network of feeders from the power sources and electrical buses dedicated 
to serve their associated loads. The two trains are isolated (except for 
interconnections between buses on separate networks) so that any single 
failure affects one network only. The ac power distribution system 
consists of the following major subsystems: 
1. Transformers and switching station 
2. 6.9-kV electrical distribution 
3. 4.16-kV electrical distribution 
4. 480-V electrical distribution 
5. 120-V vital ac 
6. Emergency diesel generators 
1. Transformers and switching station 
The transformers and switching station subsystem provides a means 
for transmitting the station output to the utility grid. This subsystem 
provides two electrically and physically independent, redundant and 
reliable transmission circuits from the grid to the plant electrical dis­
tribution system. 
For this particular power plant, the switching station connects the 
plant to a HV switchyard by means of two, 230-kV transmission lines. 
Each line is on an independent structure sharing a common right of way. 
The switching station contains a structure for terminating the two trans-
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mission lines, two motor-operated disconnect switches, two oil circuit 
breakers (OCB) and interconnecting bus and supporting structures. 
The transformer yard contains the two main transformers (MT-A and 
MT-B), the two startup transformers (ST-A and ST-B), the two unit auxil­
iary transformers (UAT-A and UAT-B)', connecting buses and overhead lines. 
The main transformers are each half load, delta-wye connected, shell form 
transformers that step up the output voltage of the main generator (GEN-3) 
from 25 kV to 230 kV. Each main transformer is rated at 600 MVA, 3 phase, 
60 Hz and is of the forced oil-to-air (FDA) cooled type. The two startup 
transformers are 33.6/44.8/56 MVA, wye-delta connected, core form trans­
formers that step down the grid voltage from 230 kV to 7.2 kV and 4.36 kV 
for in-plant loads. Each startup transformer supplies its X windings at 
7.2 kV, 21.6/28.8/36 MVA and its Y windings are 4.36 kV, 12/16/20 MVA. 
The two startup transformers are connected to the switching station 
through the motor-operated disconnects (EDS-A and EDS-B). 
The two unit auxiliary transformers are connected through isolated 
phase taps to the main bus of the generator. These are 39/52 MVA, delta-
delta connected, sealed tank transformers that step down the generator 
output from 25 kV to 6.9 kV and 4.16 kV for in-plant loads. Each unit 
auxiliary transformer supplies its X windings at 6.9 kV, 24/32 MVA and its 
Y windings at 4.16 kV, 15/20 MVA, An isolated phase bus is used to con­
nect the generator to the low voltage bushings of the main transformers. 
The main transformers are connected in parallel through an isolated 
phase bus, which is connected in turn to the main generator bus. Isolated 
phase taps are used to connect the unit auxiliary transformers to the 
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generator bus. The eight medium voltage (secondary) transformer windings 
(two each for the two startup and the two unit auxiliary transformers) are 
connected to the plant electrical distribution system switchgear through 
cable bus ducts. 
During normal operation, the transformers and switching station are in 
a fixed lineup. The most dynamic time for this subsystem is during shut­
down or startup operations when transfers to and from the startup trans­
formers take place. While the plant electrical distribution system is 
being supplied from the unit auxiliary transformers, the startup trans­
formers are in a standby condition. If the main generator fails, the out­
put breakers (OCB S7120 and S7130) will open and the plant loads would be 
shifted automatically to the startup transformers. The transformer 
cooling systems are aligned with one group selected as a lead cooling unit 
and the other group as a standby cooling unit. As winding temperature 
increases, the lead cooling group starts. The standby cooling group will 
start if the temperature increases to a higher temperature. 
2. 6.9-kV electrical distribution 
The 6.9-kV electrical distribution subsystem supplies power to the 
major motors (4000 hp and above) in the plant that are not safety-related. 
This subsystem is operable as long as the main generator or the 230-kV 
grid are in service. Unless the 6.9-kV subsystem is removed from service 
for maintenance, power will be available to the major motors all the time. 
The 6.9-kV electrical distribution subsystem originates at the X 
windings of the startup and the unit auxiliary transformers. The sub­
system receives power from the main generator through the unit auxiliary 
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transformers during normal conditions or from the startup transformers 
when the main generator is in the shutdown mode. Both transformers supply 
6.9-kV nominal power to the buses. The 6.9-kV switchgear distributes the 
power received from the transformers to the 6.9-kV motors. There are two 
buses, lA and IB, which connect the power to the individual motor feeder 
breakers. The 6.9-kV motors that receive power from these two buses are 
the 4 reactor coolant pumps (RCP), 4 circulating water pumps (CWP) and 3 
condensate pumps (CP). 
During plant startup, ac power from the 230-kV grid is transformed 
into 6.9-kV power by the startup transformers. Once the main generator is 
on-line, the power supplied to the redundant 6.9-kV buses (lA and IB) from 
the startup transformers is transferred to the unit auxiliary transfor­
mers. After the transfer is complete, the main supply breakers (1) are 
interlocked so that only one source of power is supplying the bus. If 
the power supply from the unit auxiliary transformer is lost, the supply 
will shift to the startup tranformer. The failure of either 6.9-kV bus 
will result in a trip of the reactor by the reactor protection system 
(low flow) . 
When power is supplied to the buses, the operator can close feeder 
breakers to the various motors as needed. Protective relaying is provided 
as a means of preventing excessive damage to components from electrical 
faults. Undervoltage relays in the switchgear assembly will trip all 
feeder breakers on loss of power to the bus. These undervoltage relays 
are connected to potential transformers that reduce the 6.9-kV bus voltage 
to 115 V for safety and for the use of indication and control equipment. 
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Overcurrent relays will trip incoming breakers if excessive current flows 
due to a faulted bus or an outgoing feeder breaker fails to trip when 
there is a fault on the feeder. 
3. 4.16-kV electrical distribution . 
The 4.16-kV electrical distribution subsystem provides power to all 
the plant loads with the exception of motors that have horsepowers of 
3000 or greater. This subsystem is required during normal plant opera­
tions, startup and shutdown conditions and in emergency situations. 
During normal conditions, power is supplied from the transformers and dis­
tributed throughout the plant by this subsystem. If offsite power is 
lost, the vital plant loads are supplied from emergency diesel generators. 
The 4.16-kV electrical distribution subsystem consists of four buses 
(two divisions) of nonvital loads and three buses (three divisions) of 
vital loads. Normally, the nonvital divisions supply the vital divi­
sions with power. The divisions are separated into two major groups such 
that a single major fault will not jeopardize the plant. 
The two vital divisions are protected from any loss of power by the 
emergency diesel generators. The third vital division receives its power 
from one of the other two vital divisions. However, this bus (3ABS) can­
not receive power from both buses simultaneously. This bus supplies power 
to equipment that is standby to equipment on the other buses. Either 
major vital bus can supply sufficient power to shut down the plant and 
mitigate core damage. Each of the 4.16-kV buses further provide power 
supply to transformers that reduce the voltage for operating equipment 
that require lower voltage. 
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The major components associated with the 4.16-kV electrical distribu­
tion subsystem are as follows: 
4.16-kV switchgear 
• buses 2A and 2B 
buses 4A and 4B 
• buses 3AS and 3BS . 
bus 3ABS 
• cable bus duct 
• nonsegregated phase bus duct 
cable feeders 
The normal plant electrical distribution system is supplied by four 
nonsafety-related switchgear assemblies. In addition, the three safety-
related switchgear assemblies receive power from the normal distribution 
system or from the emergency diesel generators. The electrical buses 2A 
and 2B supply 4.16-kV motors, station service transformers, nonsafety 
buses 4A and 4B, and safety buses 3AS and 3BS. Each bus (2A or 2B) is 
supplied from its own startup and unit auxiliary transformers through an 
incoming line breaker (1 and 4). The two incoming breakers (1 and 4) are 
interlocked so that only one transformer can supply the bus at a time. 
The supply for these buses would automatically transfer to the startup 
transformer if the unit auxiliary transformer fails, or the main generator 
trips. 
The buses 4A and 4B are supplied from buses 2A and 2B, and they serve 
the supplementary water chiller area. The incoming feeders are connected 
directly to the bus without circuit breakers. The feeder breakers in 
buses 2A and 2B provide for bus protection. The feeders that serve the 
administration building and the station service transformers are protected 
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by overcurrent relays and ground fault alarms. The feeders to the supple­
mentary chillers are protected by thermal overload relays. 
The safety-related motors and load centers are powered from buses 3AS 
and 3BS. Each bus has two incoming feeder breakers (11 and 15). One 
breaker connects its normal supply from the nonsafety bus and the other 
connects the output from the emergency diesel generator. The feeder from 
the nonsafety-related buses have overcurrent protection and undervoltage 
relays. If there is trouble in the subsystem or on the feeder, these 
relays will trip the breaker. These relays will also start the diesel 
generator and initiate a permissive loading sequence. A breaker is pro­
vided on each bus (3AS or 3BS) for supplying power to bus 3ABS. These 
breakers (1) have overcurrent protection but not ground fault alarms. The 
"installed reserve" safety-related motors are powered from bus 3ABS. This 
bus may be connected to either bus 3AS or 3BS, but not both at the same 
time. If the bus is shifted from one supply to the other, the 480-V ac 
power supply is also changed accordingly. 
The feeders from the startup and unit auxiliary transformers to the 
normal supply buses, 2A and 2B, consist of 15 conducting cables (5 per 
phase). These cables are arranged in a steel ventilated duct with spacers 
between the cables. Similar cable bus ducts are used to supply buses 3AS 
and 3BS from buses 2A and 2B respectively. The two feeders that go to 
bus 3ABS and 3AS and 3BS are called nonsegregated phase bus ducts. This 
connection is made using rigid conductors instead of cables. The cable 
feeders to the loads on the nonvital buses are composed of cable in 
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conduit. Each feeder is a rubber-insulated, shielded conductor. The 
feeders consist of six conductors, two for each phase. 
During generator shutdown conditions, the 4.16-kV electrical distri­
bution subsystem is supplied from the startup transformers. The buses 2A 
and 2B further provide supply to buses 3AS and 3BS respectively. When the 
main generator is on-line, the loads are shifted to the unit auxiliary 
transformers. This is the normal line-up during normal plant operating 
conditions. 
There are two basic built-in safety devices that will provide reli­
able in-plant power. First, if a fault causes the loss of the unit 
auxiliary transformers, the power loadings will be shifted to the startup 
transformers automatically. If further problems are encountered, i.e., a 
loss of offsite power, the breakers (8 and 10) between the nonvital and 
vital buses will open and lock out. The emergency diesel generators will 
start. Once these diesel generators are running, the loads will be 
picked up by the automatic sequencing system. 
For normal plant operation, the unit auxiliary transformer supplies 
bus 2k. This further supplies bus 3AS and this in turn supplies other 
buses and transformers for in-plant loads. The same is true for bus 2B 
and its associated buses. 
The safety-related motors supplied with power from the safety-related 
buses 3AS, 3BS and 3ABS are for the following: 
• high pressure safety injection pumps 
• low pressure safety injection pumps 
essential services water chiller compressors 
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• component cooling water pumps 
• auxiliary component cooling water pumps 
• containment spray pumps 
• emergency feedwater pumps 
Figure 6 shows the various equipment (safety and nonsafety) loads 
that are aligned to the 4.16-kV electrical buses. 
4. 480-V electrical distribution 
The 480-V electrical distribution subsystem provides and distributes 
electrical power to motors and various other lower voltage loads. It also 
provides power for the 480-V ac safety-related loads that are required for 
the safe shutdown of the plant. This subsystem is operable during start­
up, normal operation, shutdown and emergency conditions. The safety-
related loads are distributed in redundant groups such that the loss of 
one group will not affect the safe shutdown of the plant. 
The 480-V electrical distribution subsystem consists of two major 
sections, i.e., nonvital and vital sections. All the 480-V ac power is 
supplied by station service transformers from the 4.16-kV electrical dis­
tribution subsystem. The nonvital section is divided into two redundant 
divisions. The safety-related (vital) section is also divided into two 
redundant divisions. There is a third safety-related division that 
powers the "installed reserve safety loads." This division can be fed 
from either safety-related division, but it cannot be connected to both at 
the same time. The nonvital and vital load centers distribute 480-V ac 
power to the larger components and the motor control centers. 
The motor control centers provide power to the smaller components 
throughout the plant. The safety-related section is distributed into 
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Figure 6. Electrical loads on the 4.16-kV distribution system 
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redundant groups with sufficient electrical and physical separation. This 
prevents a fire or some physical problem from causing the loss of both 
groups at the same time. The nonsafety sections are constructed with 
similar separation whenever possible. 
The 480-V electrical distribution subsystem operates essentially the 
same in all modes of plant operation. Once the subsystem is energized, it 
remains fairly unchanged. 
The nonvital distribution section consists of 12 station service 
transformers, 6 load centers and 19 motor control centers. The vital 
distribution section supplies the equipment necessary for emergency reac­
tor protection and support. This section can be supplied from the offaite 
power system or by the emergency diesel generators. The vital section 
consists of 4 station service transformers, 3 load centers and 13 motor 
control centers. The motor control centers consist of metal-enclosed 
groups of motor starters and control devices. The motor starters consist 
of a contactor and a circuit breaker enclosed in a molded case for pro­
tection. These are called "combination starters." 
5. 120-V vital ac 
The 120-V vital ac subsystem provides a reliable, uninterruptible 
supply of 120-V ac power to the plant protection system, engineered safety 
feature (ESF) system and various other loads during startup and normal 
operation of the plant. It is also designed to provide the necessary 
power to those loads that are required to safely shut down and cool down 
the reactor under normal and emergency conditions. 
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The subsystem consists of seven static uninterruptible power supplies 
(SUPS). Six SUPS are for safety-related loads and one SUPS is for non-
safety-related load. Four of the safety-related SUPS provide power for 
the plant protection system, including the reactor protection systems and 
core protection calculators, and other instrumentation and control systems 
that monitor and control the reactivity, temperature and other vital pa­
rameters within the reactor core. The other two safety-related SUPS (A-S 
and B-S) provide power for the ESF system. 
The safety-related SUPS receive their normal and bypass power from 
480-V safety-related motor control centers. If this supply fails, the 
SUPS will automatically receive power from the 125-V dc battery. The 
static inverter receives the regulated dc output of the rectifier (battery 
charger) and changes it to high quality ac. The 125-V dc battery remains 
in a "float" condition to automatically supply the inverter when the 
rectifier output becomes unavailable. The nonsafety-related SUPS (AB) 
provides power to other important but nonsafety-related loads. 
6. Emergency diesel generators 
The emergency diesel generators provide two independent onsite power 
sources dedicated to their respective ESF system trains. Each diesel 
generator is capable of providing 100 percent power requirements for its 
respective 4.16-kV safety bus in the event of the loss of the auxiliary 
transformers and the startup transformers. The diesel generators and 
their auxiliaries provide the emergency power for the safe shutdown of 
the reactor, the removal of reactor residual heat, and the maintenance of 
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the reactor in a safely shutdown condition upon the loss of preferred ac 
power. 
Each diesel generator set is a complete package unit with all auxil­
iaries required to make it a self-sufficient power source with the capa­
bility for automatic starting and loading. The control circuits for each 
diesel generator operate from separate 125-V dc systems supplied from 
separate station batteries. The diesel generator EGA-IA is aligned to 
supply power to the 4.16-kV bus 3AS, and the diesel generator EGA-IB is 
aligned to supply power to the 4.16-kV bus 3BS. Each of the diesel 
generator units is rated at 4400 kW, 0.8 power factor and 4.16 kV. 
The diesels are equipped with air starting mechanisms and a separate 
air starting system. Each diesel engine has auxiliary systems that main­
tain adequate engine temperature to ensure fast starts. These systems 
include a jacket water heater and a lubricating oil heater. Cooling water 
to the diesel generator jacket water heat exchangers is supplied from the 
component cooling water system (CCWS). 
Each diesel generator can be started automatically by either a safety 
injection actuation signal (SIAS) or by the undervoltage relays on the 
respective 4.16-kV safety buses. If both diesel generators are available, 
both will start automatically upon receipt of the SIAS. If the undervol­
tage relays for the safety buses sense a "dead" bus, the associated diesel 
generator will be automatically started and connected to its respective 
bus. After the automatic start, each diesel generator unit attains rated 
speed and rated voltage within 6 seconds and automatically accepts loads 
in sequence as well as subsequent manually-applied loads. Each diesel 
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engine is a 16-cylinder, V-type, turbocharged, 4-stroke engine. The rated 
speed of the engine is 600 rpm. The engine trips on overspeed at 660 rpm 
and also on generator differential. 
The major components in each diesel generator unit are; • 
• diesel engine 
emergency diesel lube oil system 
emergency diesel cooling system 
• emergency diesel generator air system 
emergency diesel fuel system 
generator 
B. Onsite Uninterruptible dc Power 
The onsite dc power distribution system consists of three batteries 
and related auxiliaries. The dc power system provides uninterruptible 
125-V dc power continuously to specific loads that are required for the 
safe operation and shutdown of the reactor plant. The system also sup­
plies power to control systems, instrumentation systems and other opera­
tionally essential loads. These loads include valve solenoids, control 
circuit relays and dc motors that operate essential backup components. 
During emergency operations, the system provides power to safety-related 
loads, essential nonsafety-related loads and the nonsafety uninterruptible 
120-V ac power system. 
The dc system consists of three 125-V batteries with each having its 
own battery chargers, dc load center and distribution panels. Each 
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battery is a bank of 60 lead-acid cells and is rated 1200 amp-hour for an 
eight-hour rate, or 600 amp-hour for one-hour rate of discharge of 1.75 
volts per cell at 25® C. The three batteries, designated 3A-S, 3B-S and 
3AB-S, and their associated load centers and distribution panels have been 
arranged to feed the safety-related redundant dc loads and the nonsafety-
related loads associated with divisions A, B and AB. The batteries float 
on their respective buses. The battery chargers convert the 480-V ac 
input power to dc by means of a rectifier unit consisting of silicon-
controlled rectifiers and silicon diodes. The battery chargers also pro­
vide power supply to the normal dc load on the buses. A blocking diode 
prevents the dc batteries from backfeeding into the dc rectifier of the 
inverter. 
Each battery supply is continuously available during normal and 
emergency operation. The batteries are maintained in a fully charged 
condition and have sufficient stored energy to operate all necessary 
circuit breakers. They also provide an adequate amount of energy for all 
the required emergency loads. The battery chargers for one component 
subsystem are independent of the battery chargers of the other subsystems. 
Each battery charger has an input ac and output dc circuit breaker for 
isolation of the charger. Each battery charger is designed to prevent the 
ac supply from becoming a load on the battery due to a power feedback as 
the result of a loss of ac power to the chargers. 
45 
C. Summary 
The above description of the major subsystems provides comprehensive 
information about the functions and basic operation of the electrical 
power distribution system. This information is required to facilitate 
evaluation of system reliability that Includes causal events in a proba­
bilistic risk assessment effort. Since each subsystem is an integral part 
of the electric power distribution system, component failures in a sub­
system contribute to the total system unavailability. Hence, each sub­
system may be qualitatively examined to identify potential contributions 
to system unavailability. 
The emergency power system is one of the vital portions of the elec­
trical power distribution system. An adequate supply of auxiliary power 
to the engineered safety systems in a nuclear power plant in the event of 
abnormal conditions is required to bring the station to a safe shutdown. 
Therefore, a systematic approach to evaluating the reliability of the 
electrical power distribution system is important. 
The techniques in reliability assessment methodology presented in the 
previous chapter could be applied to evaluate the overall reliability of 
any electrical power distribution system. These techniques are the 
reliability block diagram model and the fault tree process. The unavail­
ability of the 4.16-kV safety bus to provide adequate power to the 
engineered safety feature systems during an abnormal event in a nuclear 
power plant is analyzed by these techniques in the following section. 
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VI. SYSTEM RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
The emergency power system (EPS) is a vital portion of the electrical 
power distribution system. This system consists of: two sources of off-
site ac power (the preferred source), two sources of onsite ac power (the 
emergency diesel generators), three sources of dc power (three 125-V 
batteries)J and auxiliary equipment such as station service transformers, 
buses and cables for the distribution of power to the engineered safety 
feature (ESF) systems. The EPS originates at the high voltage switchyard 
and terminates at the 4.16-kV ESF buses (3AS, 3BS or 3ABS). Each 4.16-kV 
ESF bus supplies power to the vital plant loads, e.g., pumps and other 
equipment in safety-related systems, during emergency situations. 
The principal function of the EPS is to provide adequate power to 
the ESF loads to mitigate the effects of probable operational incidents. 
Since the 4.16-kV ESF buses are the backbone buses of the EPS, the relia­
bility of this system to ensure sufficient ESF system operability during 
the course of an incident is evaluated at any of the buses, 3AS or 3BS. 
Therefore, "insufficient power on a 4.16-kV ESF bus" describes the condi­
tions of bus unavailability to perform its mission. 
The reliability analysis for the EPS depends on failure data for the 
major components associated with the distribution of adequate power to 
each 4.16-kV ESF bus. The system reliability can be evaluated by an 
equation based on the reliability, block diagram (RBD) drawn for the hard­
ware associated with the EPS mission. The RBD is generated from the 
simplified system-success pathway for the basic operation of any system. 
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A. Failure Data 
The failure data for the major components in the emergency power 
system consist of two predominant types; 
1. Operating failure rate (X^) which denotes the probability of 
failure of the component to operate or function for a period 
of time, generally per hour. 
2. Demand probability (Q^) which denotes the probability that the 
component fails upon demand to operate, start or change a state 
or function at the time of an incident. 
Table 4 provides the data for electrical equipment failure from the basic 
failure modes associated with each component. The data are utilized for 
the quantitative assessment of system reliability or unavailability on a 
point-estimate basis. 
The failure rate for the main generator was assessed from monthly 
data of forced outages for U.S. nuclear power plants in commercial opera­
tion from January 1980 to November 1982 [26]. A forced outage is the 
loss of electrical power on a main generator tripout. from some ^ off-normal 
plant condition. The monthly data of forced outages are shown in the 
Appendix. These data provided the basis for estimating the average 
forced outage per operating unit in a month as 0.862. This value was 
used in estimating the failure (tripout) rate of main generator as 
1.159x10 ^/hr based on 31 days in a month. The failure data for the 
other equipment were extracted from the Appendix III of the Reactor 
Safety Study. 
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Table 4. Failure Rates (XQ) and demand failure probabilities (Q^) for the 
basic components in the reliability block diagram 
Component Failure Mode 
Computational 
Median 
Main Generator 
UAT Disconnect 285A 
Transformer UAT-A 
Feeder Breaker 1-2A 
230-kV Grid (Offsite Power) 
Motor-Operated Disconnect 
EDS-A 
Transformer ST-A 
Feeder Breaker 4-2A 
Feeder Breaker 8-2A 
Tie Breaker 11-3AS 
Diesel Generator lA 
Circuit Breaker 14-3AS 
Trip Out 
Fail Open 
Short Circuit 
Trip Open 
Loss of Power 
Fail to Operate 
Short Circuit 
Fail to Close 
Trip Open 
Trip Open 
Fail to Start 
Trip Open 
I.159xlO"^/hr 
IxlO"®/hr 
lxlO"^/hr 
lxlO"^/hr 
lxlO"^/hr 
3xlO"4/d 
lxlO"^/hr 
lxlO"^/d 
1x10 ^/hr 
1x10 ^/hr 
3xI0"^/d 
lxlO"^/hr 
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Abnormal events in a nuclear power plant such as a loss of coolant 
accident results in a turbine trip. The turbine trip causes a sudden loss 
of electrical power generation that upsets the steady-state stability of 
the transmission grid. Based on information provided by the Federal Power 
Commission, the probability of losing offsite power because of induced 
power transients (turbine trip) was assessed in the Reactor Safety Study 
to be 1x10 ^/hr for any locale in the United States. This value was used 
in the evaluation of system reliability of the 4.16-kV ESF bus. 
B. System Reliability of the 4.16-kV ESF Bus 
The reliability block diagram (RBD) for the 4.16-kV ESF bus, 3AS or 
3BS, is shown in Figure 7. The RBD is drawn for the major components that 
operate normally to provide sufficient power supply to the 4.16-kV bus for 
preserving the safety functions of the nuclear power plant. Based on the 
RBD, the system reliability based on hardware failures only is evaluated 
by the following equation: 
R' = 1 - (1 - R^RgR^R^) (1 - RgRgR^Rg) (6.1) 
"sys - 1 - <1 - R'Vlo' " - (S'2) 
The estimates for the reliability (R^) of each component to perform its 
design function on a single demand within a one-hour duration of the 
postulated accident were obtained from the associated failure data as 
shown on Table 4. 
Transf, 
UAT-A 
Feeder 
BKR 1-2A 
Main 
Generator 
Disconnect 
285A 
230 kV 
Grid 
Transf 
ST-A 
Feeder 
BKR 4-2A 
M.O. Disc 
EDS-A 
R5 Rg Ry Rg 
Diesel Gen. Circuit BKR 
lA 14-3^ 
^11 ^12 
Figure 7. Reliability block diagram for a 4.16-kV ESF bus 
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Using the numerical values obtained for the basic component failures, 
the computation for system reliability was performed as follows: 
= exp {-(0.001159 + 0.000001 + 0.000001 + 0.000001)} 
= 0.998839 
R-RfR^Ro = exp {-(0.001 + 0.0003 + 0.000001 + 0.001)} 
J o / o 
= 0.997702 
R' = 1 - (1 - 0.998839) (1 - 0.997702) 
= 0.999997 
R'RgR^O = (0.999997) x exp {-(0.000001 + 0.001)} 
= 0.998997 
^11^12 ~ {-(0.03 + 0.001)} 
= 0.969476 
Rsys = 1 - (1 - 0.998997) (1 - 0.969476) 
= 0.999969 
-5 System unavailability, q = 3.1 x 10 
System failure rate, = 3.1 x 10 ^/hr 
C. Fault Tree Analysis 
The reliability analysis for a system must be accompanied by the 
identification of causal relationships between hardware, human and 
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environmental events. A fault tree is a graphical representation of the 
causal relationships obtained when a system hazard is traced backward to 
search for its possible causes. The probability of loss of electric power 
to the ESF systems during a LOCA can be evaluated by means of a Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA). 
The undesired event subjected to analysis in this study is the loss 
of electric power to the 4.16-kV ESF bus (3AS or 3BS). This event is 
defined as "insufficient power on bus 3AS" and is the top event of the 
simplified fault tree for the 4.16-kV electrical distribution system. 
Since this system is fully redundant, the total loss of electric power to 
and from the 4.16-kV electrical distribution system can only be caused by 
two simultaneous bus failures: one in Train A and the other in Train B. 
These failures are caused by failures of components or events that are essen­
tially identical in each train. Hence, the fault analysis considered in this 
study is confined to the determination of the availability (or reliability) 
of either 4.16-kV ESF bus (3AS or 3BS) to perform its design function. 
1. Initial assumptions 
The construction and probabilistic evaluation of the 4.16-kV ESF bus 
system fault tree and the subtrees is based on the following categories 
of assumptions: a) general assumptions, b) human interaction and c) hard­
ware assumptions. 
a) General assumptions 
i) The emergency buses (3AS and 3BS) are available during 
normal plant operation. 
ii) Those events that appear in single or double cut sets are 
included in the fault trees of the individual buses asso-
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elated with the 4.16-kV ESF bus system. Nonsafety buses 
and loads that are isolated from the 4.16-k.V ESF bus by 
two or more circuit breakers are not considered potential 
fault sources. 
b") Human interaction 
1) There is no credit for operator action that compensates for 
a failure during the first hour following a LOSP transient. 
This is about the time required to uncover the reactor core 
upon loss of electric power coincident with a loss of cool­
ant accident. For most of this period, the operator is 
normally not permitted to act independently or to leave the 
control room. 
c') Hardware assumptions 
i) Distribution faults in the HV switchyard are short circuits 
on the buses that result from improper operation of the 
various circuit breakers. 
ii) The batteries provide sufficient dc control power to the 
ESF equipment during the critical time period. 
2. Description of the fault tree 
The events in the fault tree are represented by a systematic coding 
scheme. Figure 8 shows the coding scheme, which identifies the events by 
system, component type, component identification and failure mode. The 
fault event codes used to identify the various basic events are provided 
in Table 5. 
The simplified fault tree for the 4.16-kV ESF bus is shown in 
Figure 9. The three events that cause insufficient power on a 4.16-kV ESF 
bus can be described as follows: 
a) Short circuit on bus This event includes all short circuits 
on the bus structure that cause the bus voltage to drop below an accept­
able level. 
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Failure Mode 
Component Identifier 
Component Type 
System 
Figure 8. Coding scheme for fault event 
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Table 5. Fault event codes 
Code System Code Component Code Failure Mode 
BY Battery A Fail to Start 
BS Bus B Open Circuit 
CB Circuit Breaker C Fail to Close 
DS Disconnect D Fail to Open 
DG Diesel Generator F Loss of Function 
FB Feeder Breaker L Loss of Power 
GE Main Generator 0 Open 
TR Transformer Q Short Circuit 
00 Event X Operator Error 
SY Switchyard 
Insufficient Power 
on Bus 3AS 
Insufficient Power 
Input to Bus 3AS 
Distribution Faults 
Through 
Load Breakers 
Bus 3AS 
Fails 
Shorted 
EBS003Q 
Loss of AC Power 
to Bus 3AS 
Insufficient Power 
from 
Diesel Gen. System 
Figure 9. Simplified fault tree for a 4.16-kV ESF bus 
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Cet. BKR 
14-3AS 
Fails to 
Close 
EDGOOIQ ECB014C 
'Distrib. > 
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Diesel Gen 
V System J 
Diesel Gen.^ 
Fails to Start 
or Accept Load 
^After Start ^  
Diesel Gen. 
•^ails to Supply Load^ 
After Successful Start 
Load Acceptance 
Cet. BKR 14-3AS 
Inadvertently 
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Insufficient Power 
from 
Diesel Gen. System 
Insufficient Power 
from 
Diesel Generator 
Insufficient 
Control Power 
to Close Cet. 
BKR 14-3AS 
After LOSP 
Fa  
EDGOOIA 
EDGOOIF 
Figure 9. (Continued) 
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BATT 
EBY003B 
Open Cet 
Failure 
on Bus 
3A-DC-S 
EBS0D3B 
BATT 3A-S 
Fails 
Shorted 
Bus 
3A-DC-S 
Fails 
Shorted 
Insufficient Power 
on Bus 3A-DC-S 
Short Circuit 
Failures on 
Bus 3A—DC—S 
Insufficient Control 
Power to Close Cet. 
BKR 14-3AS After LOSP 
EBY003Q EBS0D3Q 
Figure 9. (Continued) 
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Feeder BKR 
8-2A 
Trips Open 
EFB0080 
Short 
Circuit 
on Bus 2A 
EBS002Q 
Loss of Offsite 
Power to Bus 2A 
Loss of AC Power 
to Bus 2A 
Insufficient Power 
to Bus 2A 
Loss of AC Power 
to Bus 3AS 
Tie Breaker 
11-3AS 
Inadvertently 
Opens 
Figure 9. (Continued) 
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Figure 9. (Continued) 
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Figure 9. (Continued) 
62 
A 
Distribution Faults 
Thru Load Breakers 
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Figure 9. (Continued) 
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Figure 9. (Continued) 
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b) Insufficient power input to bus This event represents the 
loss of power at the bus due to external failures. Inadequate power 
supply to this bus can be caused by total loss of available ac power and 
failure of the emergency diesel generator. 
c) Distribution faults through load breakers This event repre­
sents a double fault, viz., a short on any feeder cable from the bus and 
failure of the load breaker to open. 
Insufficient power from the diesel generator system to the 4.16-kV 
ESF bus is primarily due to diesel generator failure to start or operate 
after a successful start and load acceptance. Other events that can con­
tribute to insufficient power supply from the diesel generator system 
involve the output circuit breaker (14-3AS) as well as distribution shorts 
within the system itself. The output circuit breaker can trip open or 
fail to close, especially when there is insufficient control power after 
a LOSP transient. Inadequate control power can result from failures on 
the dc power system. These failures can arise from short circuits on the 
dc bus and its associated battery. 
The total loss of available ac power can be caused by the loss of 
normal ac power to the connecting bus (2A) coincident with loss of off-
site power. Loss of normal ac power is primarily due to a forced outage, 
i.e., the main generator trips as a result of an abnormal condition. 
Other events that can contribute to the loss of normal ac power to bus 2A 
are the opening of the normally closed disconnect (EDISC-285A) to the unit 
auxiliary transformer, a short circuit on the main generator bus, inad­
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vertent opening of the feeder breaker 1-2A and failures on the unit 
auxiliary transformer. 
The loss of offsite power to bus 2A is primarily due to loss of power 
from the 230-kV transmission grid caused by power instabilities or exter­
nal events such as lightning, hurricanes, etc. Other events that may 
inhibit available offsite power to bus 2A are distribution faults in the 
HV switchyard, the opening of the motor-operated disconnect EDS-A, 
failures on the startup transformer and failure of the associated feeder 
breaker 4-2A to close properly on demand. 
Because of equipment diversity and physical separation, the 4.16-kV 
electrical distribution system is not susceptible to common cause fail­
ures. No single event such as calibration errors, instrument drifts, 
relay settings, fire or electrical transients due to abnormal plant 
conditions could incapacitate the 4.16-kV electrical system. However, the 
offsite power source and the onsite power source can be vulnerable to 
common cause failures. Based on the common cause failure evaluations, the 
probability of losing offsite power had been estimated to be 1x10 ^ [1]. 
Some common cause failures that could result in the unavailability of the 
onsite power source, i.e., the emergency diesel generator, are abnormal 
weather, contamination of the air-start system, dirty fuel oil, lack of 
lubrication, fouling of diesel generator cooling heat exchangers and dirty 
relay contacts. 
3. Quantitative analysis 
The basic events identified in the fault tree and their associated 
probabilities facilitate the calculation of the probability of the top 
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event using the Boolean algebraic process. The point estimates for the 
failure rates and demand failure probabilities of the various components 
in the system were calculated from actual operating data or obtained from 
industrial sources [1, 26, 27]. Table 6 shows the operating experience 
data for the diesel generator events identified in the system fault tree. 
These data provided the basis for estimating the failure probabilities 
associated with the diesel generators for weekly and monthly testing 
intervals. The basic events describing the failure modes of the various 
components and their associated probabilities are provided in Table 7. 
Table 6. Operating experience data of Cooper-Bessemer diesel generator 
(4-MW rating) in commercial nuclear power plants from 1 January 
1976 to 31 December 1978 
Event Number of Failures 
Failure to Start 7 
Failure to Continue Operating After 
Successful Start and Load Acceptance 12 
Total Number of Demands or 
Number of Operating Hours = 468 (Weekly Testing) 
= 108 (Monthly Testing) 
The top event in the system fault tree is "insufficient power on bus 
3AS." This event is the OR combination of bus short circuit (EBS003Q), 
insufficient power input to the bus 3AS and distribution faults through 
the load breakers. The intermediate event, "insufficient power input to 
67 
Table 7. Failure rates (AQ) and demand failure probabilities (Q^) for 
the basic events in the fault tree 
Basic 
Event Component Failure Mode 
Computational 
Median 
E00230L® 230-kV Grid Loss of Power lxl0"^/hr 
EDS115F* Motor-Operated 
Disconnect EDS-A Fail to Operate 3xlO"^/d 
EDSllSX^ Motor-Operated 
Disconnect EDS-A 
Operator Error During 
Manual Operation lxlO"^/d 
ETROOIB* Transformer ST-A Open Circuit lxl0"^/hr 
ETROOIQ^ Transformer ST-A Short Circuit 1x10 ^/hr 
ESY230Q^ HV Switchyard Short Circuit 3xlO"®/hr 
EFB004C* Feeder Breaker 4-2A Fail to Close lxlO"^/d 
EGEOOSL^ Main Generator Trip Out 1.159xl0"^/hr 
ETR002B^ Transformer UAT-A Open Circuit 1x10 ^/hr 
ETR002Q^ Transformer UAT-A Short Circuit lxlO"®/hr 
EFBOOlO* Feeder Breaker 1-2A Trip Open 1x10 ^/hr 
EFBOOIX^ Feeder Breaker 1-2A Operator Error in 
Premature Transfer lxlO"^/d 
EDS2850* Disconnect 285A Fail Open 1x10 ^/hr 
EBSOOOQ* Main Generator Bus Short Circuit 3xl0~^/hr 
EBS002Q^ Bus 2A Short Circuit 2xlO"^/hr 
^Appendix III, Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400). 
^Information in March 10, 1980 letter from D. Ross (Nuclear Regula­
tory Commission) to all pending Operating License Applicants of 
Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering NSSS designs. 
'^Estimate obtained from outage data as shown in AppeiiJi::. 
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Table 7. (Continued) 
Basic 
Event Component Failure Mode 
Computational 
Median 
EDGOOIA Diesel Generator lA 
EDGOOIF Diesel Generator lA 
EBS0D3B Bus 3A-DC-S 
EBS0D3Q Bus 3A-DC-S 
EBY003B® Battery 3A-S 
EBY003Q* Battery 3A-S 
EDGOOIQ^ Diesel Generator lA 
ECB014C Circuit Breaker 14-3AS 
ECB0140 Circuit Breaker 14-3AS 
ECB014X Circuit Breaker 14-3AS 
ECBOllO Tie Breaker 11-3AS 
ECBOllX Tie Breaker 11-3AS 
EFBOOSO Feeder Breaker 8-2A 
ECBOOOD Load Breaker on Bus 3AS 
ECBOOOQ Load Breaker on Bus 3AS 
EBS003Q* Bus 3AS 
Fail to Start 
Fail to Continue 
Operating After 
Successful Start 
Open Circuit 
Short Circuit 
Open Circuit 
Short Circuit 
Short Circuit 
Fail to Close 
Trip Open 
Operator Error in 
Commission or Omission 
Trip Open 
Operator Error in 
Commission or Omission 
Trip Open 
Fail to Open 
Short Circuit 
Short Circuit 
1.5xlO"2/dd 
6.5x10" /d 
2.6xlO"2/hr^ 
l.lxlO" /hr® 
lxlO"^/hr 
2xlO"^/hr 
1x10 ^/hr 
3xl0~^/hr 
lxlO"®/hr 
lxlO"^/d 
lxlO"^/hr 
lxl0"^/d 
lxlO"^/hr 
lxl0"^/d 
1x10 ^/hr 
lxlO"^/d 
IxlcT^/hr 
2xl0"^/hr 
Estimates from operating experience data of diesel generators as 
shown in Table 6 for a weekly testing interval. 
'Estimates from operating experience data of diesel generators as 
shown in Table 6 for a monthly testing interval. 
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bus 3ASt" is the combination of "insufficient power from the diesel gen­
erator system" AND "loss of ac power to bus 3AS." Distribution faults 
through the load breakers is the combination of breaker failure to open 
(ECBOOOD) AND load faults on the cable side of a breaker (ECBOOOQ). 
The event "insufficient power from the diesel generator system" is 
the OR combination of four primary fault events and two intermediate 
events. The primary events are diesel generator failure to start 
(EDGOOIA) or operate after a successful start (EDGOOIF), circuit breaker 
14-3AS failure to close (ECB014C) and distribution shorts within the 
diesel generator system (EDGOOIQ). The intermediate events are "circuit 
breaker 14-3AS inadvertently trips open" and "insufficient control power 
to close circuit breaker 14-3AS after LOSP." Circuit breaker 14-3AS 
inadvertently trips open from the combination of operator error (ECB014X) 
OR failure by itself (ECB0140). Insufficient control power to close 
circuit breaker 14-3AS is the OR combination of failures on the dc power 
system such as short or open circuits on the dc bus (EBS0D3Q, EBS0D3B) and 
battery failures (EBY003Q, EBY003B). 
The event "loss of ac power to bus 3AS" is the OR combination of a 
basic event and two intermediate events. The basic event is the feeder 
breaker 8-2A trips open (EFB0080). The intermediate events are "insuffi­
cient power to bus 2A" and "tie breaker 11-3AS inadvertently opens." 
Insufficient power to bus 2A can result from a bus short circuit (EBS002Q) 
OR the logic combination of "loss of ac power to bus 2A" AND "loss of 
offsite power to bus 2A." The tie breaker 11-3AS inadvertently opens 
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from the combination of operator error (ECBOllX) OR failure by itself 
(ECBOllO). 
Loss of ac power to bus 2A is the OR combination of three basic 
events and two intermediate events. The basic events are the opening of 
disconnect EDISC-285A (EDS2850), short circuit on main generator bus 
(EBSOOOQ) and main generator failure or tripout (EGE003L). The interme­
diate events are "feeder breaker 1-2A inadvertently opens" and " trans­
former UAT-A fails." Feeder breaker 1-2A trips open from the combination 
of operator error in premature transfer (EFBOOIX) OR failure by itself 
(EFBOOlO). The failures in the unit auxiliary transformer are shorts 
(ETR002Q) OR open circuit failure (ETR002B). 
Loss of offsite power to bus 2A is also the OR combination of three 
basic events and two intermediate events. The basic events are the loss 
of power from the 230-kV grid (E00230L), distribution faults in the HV 
switchyard (ESY230Q) and feeder breaker 4-2A failure to close (EFB004C). 
The intermediate events are "transformer ST-A fails" and "motor-operated 
disconnect EDS-A fails open." The failures in the startup transformer are 
shorts (ETROOIQ) OR open circuit failure (ETROOIB). The motor-operated 
disconnect EDS-A fails open from the combination of operator error during 
the manual operation of disconnect (EDS115X) OR failure to operate 
(EDS115F). 
The overall system unavailability was evaluated for a single demand 
of the various components to function during a one-hour interval of the 
postulated accident. The probability of the event "insufficient power on 
bus 3AS" was computed based on the loss of electric power to the individ­
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ual buses connected to it. This event was evaluated for two cases of 
testing interval for the emergency diesel generator: i) weekly, and 
ii) monthly. The occurrence probability of the top event was quantified 
by the Boolean process where the AND gate event is a multiplicative combi­
nation and the OR gate is an additive combination of the input events. 
The summary of the quantification process for the fault tree analysis of 
the emergency power system is shown in Table 8. 
Table 8. Quantification results of the fault tree 
Event Description Unavailability (q) 
Loss of Offsite Power to Bus 2A 
Loss of ac Power to Bus 2A 
Loss of ac Power to Bus 3AS 
Insufficient Control Power to Close 
Circuit Breaker 14-3AS After LOSP 
Insufficient Power from Diesel Generator 
System 
Insufficient Power on Bus 3AS 
Case I 
1.23x10 - 2  
1.12x10 - 2  
1.11x10 
,-6 
-2  
5.2x10 
5.3x10 -2  
5.88x10 -4 
Case II 
1.23x10 -2  
1.12x10 -2  
1.11x10 
_-6  
-2  
5.2x10 
1.87x10 -1 
2.08x10 -3 
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D. Conclusions 
Using data primarily from Appendix III of the Reactor Safety Study, 
the reliability of the 4.16-kV ESF bus based on the RED model for hardware 
failures only was evaluated to be 0.999969. This provides the probability 
of 4.16-kV bus unavailability per demand as 3.1x10 ^. The summary for the 
quantification results of the fault tree shows that the estimated proba-
-4 bility of 4.16-kV bus unavailability per demand are 5.88x10 and 
2.08x10 ^ for the weekly and monthly testing of diesel generators. 
The fault tree analysis shows that loss of offsite power (LOSP) is 
an important contributor to the overall unavailability of the 4.16-kV ESF 
bus. Loss of offsite power is an anticipated transient which could lead 
to power-coolant (or thermal-hydraulic) imbalances in a nuclear power 
plant. The automatic plant responses to the LOSP transient can be inves­
tigated by an event tree. The relevant operator actions to mitigate the 
effects of this initiator can be effectively analyzed by the operator 
action event tree (OAET). The OAET can identify the risk significant 
sequences that may evolve from this transient. 
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VII. THE OPERATOR ACTION EVENT TREE 
The operator action event tree (OAET) is constructed to address the 
role of the reactor operator responding to the abnormal conditions 
initiated by a transient event. The OAET presents, a logical display of 
the significant aspects of this role throughout the incident. This per­
mits the qualitative analysis of the event sequence and of the relevant 
operator action to preclude or mitigate the effects of the transient-
initiated conditions. 
The initiating event in the OAET is defined as the loss of offsite 
power (LOSP) to the nuclear plant after a main generator outage. This 
results in loss of available ac power for the reactor coolant pumps, 
condensate pumps, circulating water pumps, and pressurizer pressure and 
level control systems. Under these circumstances, the nuclear plant 
would experience simultaneous losses of load, of feedwater flow and of 
forced reactor coolant flow. 
When normal ac power is lost to the nuclear plant, all four reactor 
coolant pumps "coast down" and a reactor trip occurs due to low reactor 
coolant flow. The turbine stop valves close and an automatic turbine 
trip follows. The main feedwater flow to both steam generators decreases 
rapidly. The pressure increases in the reactor coolant system (RCS) and 
steam generator, but pressure rise is limited by the primary (pressuri­
zer) and steam generator safety valves. On loss of normal ac power, the 
emergency diesel generators are automatically started to provide ac power 
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supply to limited loads on the Engineered ëaîety feature buses (4.16-kV 
buses 3AS and 3BS). 
After a reactor trip, the decay heat must be dissipated by the main 
steam system to the environment. In the absence of forced reactor coolant 
flow, convective heat transfer is supported by natural circulation of 
reactor coolant flow. Initially, the residual water inventory in the 
steam generators provides a heat sink and the resultant steam is released 
to the atmosphere by the steam generator safety valves. Emergency feed-
water supply is automatically initiated when low steam generator water 
level is reached. Plant cooldown is controlled by the atmospheric steam 
dump valves if normal power is not restored within thirty minutes. Opera­
tor action is delayed until thirty minutes after the event. 
After the initiation of the LOSP event, the availability of the 
diesel generator to supply emergency ac power is critical throughout the 
sequence of events. Emergency ac power is required to operate the motor-
driven emergency feedwater pumps, the safety injection pumps, the compo­
nent cooling water pumps and the containment spray pumps. Therefore, the 
dominant risk sequences in the event involve the unavailability of the 
diesel generators. 
While removing decay heat and thereafter, adequate reactor coolant 
inventory must be maintained. Reactor coolant inventory is replenished 
by actuation of the safety injection pumps and the charging pumps. These 
pumps are aligned to take suction from the refueling water storage pool 
(RWSP) to provide the required makeup supply of borated water. 
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The OAET constructed for the LOSP initiator is shown in Figure 10. 
The basic states to which the nuclear plant could evolve are identified. 
The required operator responses relevant to the indicated states of the 
event tree are addressed. 
STATE LOSP-1; 
State 1 represents the automatic plant responses to the LOSP event 
and successful decay heat removal through secondary steam relief. The 
important automatic responses are reactor trip (scram), reactor coolant 
pump trip, main feedwater pump trip, circulating water pump trip and 
starting of the diesel generators. These responses result in a reactor 
condition at decay heat power level with reduced heat removal capability 
through the steam generators by main feedwater cooling. The reactor 
coolant flow is "coasting down." The reactor coolant system (RCS) ex­
periences depressurization as the average reactor coolant temperature 
(T ) decreases after a brief rapid increase. The steam flow is 
avg.' 
isolated by the closure of the turbine stop valves and the secondary 
steam pressure reaches the setpoint of the atmospheric dump valves (ADV). 
Required Operator Action: 
The operator is restricted to the diagnosis of the LOSP initiator 
and verification of the automatic responses. The operator then directs 
attention to establishing heat removal through the steam generators and 
maintaining adequate coolant inventory. If automatic steam relief is not 
achieved through the ADV or steam generator safety relief valves, the 
operator must manually produce secondary steam relief by opening the two 
ADVs. 
LOSP 
SCRAM 
RCP TRIP 
TURBINE TRIP 
MFW TRIP 
DHR 
THRU S.G. 
BY FW/SSR 
D.G. 
AUTO START 
& LOAD 
EÏWS 
AUTO 
ACTUATION 
OPERATOR 
MAINTAINS 
LONG-TERM 
FW FLOW 
OPERATOR 
MAINTAINS 
COOLANT 
INVENTORY 
10 
11 
ON 
13 
12 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Figure 10. Operator action event tree for a LOSP initiator 
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STATE .LOSP-2; 
State 2 describes the situation after the successful automatic 
delivery of emergency feedwater to the steam generator. The automatic 
plant response to the LOSP initiator has continued success. An adequate 
heat sink is provided for dissipation of decay heat in the primary system. 
Required Operator Action: 
The operator has to recognize' successful automatic emergency feed-
water system (EFWS) operation and maintain long-term EFW delivery by 
throttling flow and aligning the EFW pumps to the auxiliary component 
cooling water system (ACCWS) for emergency backup source of water if the 
condensate storage pool (CSP) becomes depleted. The motor-driven and 
turbine-driven EFW pumps start upon receipt of the emergency feedwater 
actuation signal (EFAS)' and deliver rated flow to the steam generator. 
The operator must throttle the EFW flow in about one hour to prevent 
"steam generator overfill" on the secondary side. Otherwise, the CSP will 
also be depleted in about 2.5 to 3 hours. The operator then would be 
required to align the system to the ACCWS for a backup source of emergency 
feedwater. 
STATE LOSP-3; 
State 3 shows adequate feedwater flow to the steam generators is 
maintained after controlled flow is achieved and the EFWS is aligned to a 
backup source of feedwater. Heat removal from the primary system through 
emergency feedwater cooling in the steam generator is successful. 
Required Operator Action: 
The operator has to verify stable feedwater delivery and then focus 
attention on maintaining coolant inventory. 
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STATE LOSP-4; 
State 4 represents the plant condition where the diesel generators 
started automatically and continued operating with the long-term heat 
removal through the steam generators successfully maintained after the 
LOSP event. The primary system boundary and steam generator tube integ­
rity remains intact. 
Required Operator Action: 
As a result of successful plant response, the only operator concern 
is to ensure that adequate coolant inventory is maintained throughout the 
plant cooldown. This requires appropriate charging flow to compensate 
for any mass loss through the pressurizer relief valve and level reductions 
due to fluid cooldown. 
STATE LOSP-5; 
State 5 depicts the situation where the operator is able to maintain 
long-term feedwater flow to the steam generator, but the RCS inventory is 
depleting through (i) a steam generator tube rupture, or (ii) a stuck-open 
pressurizer relief valve. In the steam generator tube rupture incident, 
slightly radioactive coolant flows into the secondary system and out of 
the containment. The stuck-open pressurizer relief valve constitutes a 
small break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). 
Required Operator Action: 
For the steam generator tube rupture incident, the operator has to 
identify and isolate the affected steam generator. He has to adjust 
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safety injection (SI) flow into.the RCS to compensate for flow out through 
the ruptured tube. Then, the primary system is to be depressurized using 
the pressurizer relief valves and by blow-down of the intact steam 
generator. This pressure reduction decreases the primary-to-secondary 
flow through the rupture. Once the leak flow is stopped by the equaliza­
tion of pressures in the RCS and the affected steam generator, normal 
plant cooldown can be commenced. 
In the case of a stuck-open pressurizer relief valve, the operator 
has to close the valve and ensure adequate SI flow into the RCS to com­
pensate for mass spill out of the stuck-open valve. 
STATE LOSP-6: 
State 6 represents the situation where long-term feedwater flow 
could not be maintained after the successful automatic EFWS initiation. 
This could be due to failure of pumps to continue running, or operator 
failure to throttle feedwater flow or align backup water to replenish the 
CSP. This state also assumes the inability to use the condensate pumps 
to deliver feedwater because offsite power is unavailable. Hence, the 
steam generator could not be used as a long-term heat sink. 
Required Operator Action: 
The operator begins the "feed and bleed" operation as an alternate 
means of heat removal. This operation requires that energy is to be 
released through the pressurizer relief valve and using high pressure 
safety injection (HPSI) pumps to maintain RCS inventory. The operator 
must manually depressurize ("bleed") the primary system by keeping the 
pressurizer relief valves open and maintain controlled HPSI flow ("feed") 
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to avoid core damage due to uncovery. Cold shutdown can then be safely 
achieved in a timely fashion. 
STATE LOSP-7; 
This state represents the plant condition following the successful 
"feed and bleed" operation to accomplish the heat removal from the RCS and 
maintenance of its inventory. 
Required Operation Action: 
The only operator concern is to monitor the progress of a safe cold 
shutdown. 
STATE LOSP-8; 
State 8 represents the plant state where feedwater delivery could not 
be maintained and the RCS inventory is depleting through either tube 
ruptures in a steam generator due to dryout or a stuck-open pressurized 
relief valve. 
Required Operator Action: 
The operator must take actions to actuate the safety injection system 
to inject borated water into the RCS for adequate heat removal and inven­
tory maintenance to prevent cladding failures upon core uncovery. The 
plant cooldown process must be closely monitored for any contingencies. 
STATE LOSP-9: 
This state describes the plant condition when the EFWS fails to auto­
matically supply feedwater to the steam generator after a successful start 
of the emergency diesel generators. The turbine-driven pump and both 
motor-driven feedwater pumps have failed to deliver sufficient flow to the 
steam generators due to either valving errors in the feedwater lines or 
pump failures. 
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Required Operator Action: 
On recognition of the EFWS failure, the operator should attempt to 
achieve adequate feedwater flow by starting one of the EFW pumps or by 
blowing down one or more steam generators. If the operator can actuate 
the turbine-driven pump and a single motor-driven EFW pump within ninety 
minutes after the LOSP event, damage to the core can be prevented. If 
the operator ascertains that EFW flow is unavailable, he should implement 
safety injection of subcooled water into the primary system. SI flow can 
be enhanced by depressurization in the RCS via steam generator blow-down. 
STATE LOSP-10; 
At this state, the operator has achieved delayed feedwater flow 
after initial failure to automatically provide EFW flow. The turbine-
driven EFW pump or the motor-driven pumps have been restored to service. 
The maintenance of long-term feedwater flow provides an adequate heat 
sink for primary system decay heat removal. 
Required Operator Action: 
Same as state 3. 
STATE LOSP-11: 
This state represents the plant condition where the operator fails to 
achieve delayed feedwater flow following the failure of the EFWS to auto­
matically actuate. There is no stable long-term heat removal path through 
the steam generator. 
Required Operator Action: 
The operator must begin the "feed and bleed" operation for adequate 
cooling of the RCS. 
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STATE LOSP-12; 
At state 12, the emergency diesel generator, failed to start automat­
ically after the LOSP event. The diesel generator failure results in the 
unavailability of the motor-driven EFW pumps, the safety injection and 
charging pumps, and component cooling water to the reactor coolant pump 
seals. Without the motor-driven EFW pumps, heat removal through the 
steam generator depends on the successful actuation of the turbine-driven 
pump. Without the safety injection or charging pumps, fluid loss from 
the RCS cannot be replenished. Without component cooling water, leakage 
past the reactor coolant pump seals can occur. 
Required Operator Action: 
After recognizing the successful automatic responses to the LOSP 
event (e.g., scram, RCP trip, etc.) and the failure of diesel generators 
to start and load, the operator has to ensure actuation of the turbine-
driven EFW pump and attempt to restore the diesel generators to opera-
bility. At this state, the station batteries become the sole source of 
power supply to the dc buses and the ac vital instrumentation buses. This 
power supply must be conserved since there is no emergency ac power to 
charge the batteries. 
STATE LOSP-13; 
At state 13, the turbine-driven EFW pump has actuated automatically 
after the LOSP event and failure of the diesel generators. This pump 
delivers sufficient flow to the steam generators to provide a heat sink 
for decay heat. This state is similar to that at state 2 except for the 
unavailability of the diesel generators. 
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Required Operator Action: 
The operator should verify successful turbine-driven EFW pump flow 
and continue attempts to start the diesel generator. Also, he has to 
throttle feedwater flow to prevent overfill and help maintain long-term 
feedwater flow. He should decrease primary system pressure to reduce any 
excessive reactor coolant pump seal leakage. Sufficient reduction in 
primary system pressure will permit safety injection tank (SIT) discharge 
to compensate for large seal leakages. 
STATE LOSP-14: 
At state 14, the operator maintains controlled EFW flow through the 
turbine-driven pump. This provides a stable long-term heat sink through 
the steam generators. 
Required Operator Action: 
The operator has to verify stable heat removal through the steam 
generators and begin necessary actions to maintain adequate primary cool­
ant inventory. The specific actions are to replenish mass loss through 
an open pressurizer relief valve and ensure adequate safety injection into 
the RCS to compensate for flow out through a steam generator tube rupture. 
STATE LOSP-15: 
At this state, the successful automatic feedwater delivery achieved 
at state 13 is not sustained. The capability for heat removal through the 
steam generators is lost. 
Required Operator Action: 
The operator should initiate "feed and bleed" cooling as an alternate 
means of decay heat removal while maintaining adequate coolant inventory. 
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STATE LOSP-16; 
State 16 describes the failure of the EFWS to provide adequate flow 
to the steam generators after the LOSP. event compounded by failure of the 
diesel generators to start. The decay heat load is not removed from the 
primary system through the steam generators. Since the diesel generators 
may be unavailable, HPSI into the primary system could not be initiated. 
Required Operator Action: 
The operator has to secure a source of ac power by attempting to 
start a diesel generator within 4500 seconds or restore off-site power. 
Core uncovery is predicted to occur after this time. Once emergency ac 
power becomes available, the operator should establish a "feed and bleed" 
mode of cooling and maintain RCS inventory through charging flow. 
STATE LOSP-17: 
This state addresses the situation where a steam generator safety 
relief valve rupture occurs in coincidence with a LOSP event. After the 
LOSP initiator and the resultant trip of the main feedwater pumps, the 
secondary system pressure increases and reaches the setpoint of a safety 
relief valve. The diesel generators are available to supply emergency ac 
power. 
Required Operator Action: 
The operator diagnoses the automatic responses to the LOSP initiator 
and the rupture of the safety relief valve. The relief valve rupture 
affects the operator intervention to ensure the stable long-term feed-
water flow to the steam generators. The operator should observe the 
coincident low level and low pressure on the secondary side of the damaged 
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steam generator. Feedwater flow to this affected steam generator should 
be decreased to prevent sudden overcooling. Charging flow for maintaining 
RCS inventory has to be throttled to prevent filling up the pressurizer 
completely. 
STATE LOSP-18; 
State 18 describes the failure of the automatic plant responses to 
the LOSP event. Failure of reactor scram could lead to core uncovery and 
subsequent cladding failures in the fuel assemblies. 
Required Operator Action: 
The operator should restore offsite ac power, or undertake appropriate 
actions to start and load the diesel generators as soon as practical. The 
restored ac power enables forced reactor coolant flow using the reactor 
coolant pumps. EFW can be provided for heat removal through the steam 
generators. The charging pumps can be actuated to provide reactor coolant 
makeup to maintain RCS inventory. These actions should mitigate the 
consequences of the event. 
A. Summary 
The OAET identified eighteen possible states that the nuclear power 
plant could evolve from the LOSP initiator. The state LOSP-1 corresponds 
to the "basic PWR transient response" where all safety functions are 
preserved. The states LOSP-2, .LOSP-3 and LOSP-4 depict the plant condi­
tion where decay heat in the primary system is successfully removed 
through the steam generators. The states LOSP-5 and LOSP-8 describe a 
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scenario where RCS inventory is depleting through a steam generator tube 
rupture or a stuck-open pressurizer relief valve. The state LOSP-6 shows 
the loss of a long-term heat sink in the steam generator while state 
LOSP-7 represents the successful accomplishment of heat removal from the 
RCS by a "feed and bleed" operation. 
The states LOSP-9, LOSP-10 and LOSP-11 involve the loss of main 
feedwater initiator coupled with failure of the emergency feedwater 
system. State LOSP-12 and the plant states LOSP-13, LOSP-14, LOSP-15 and 
LOSP-16 that evolve from it involve the loss of offsite power initiator 
coincident with the subsequent failure of both diesel generators. The 
state LOSP-17 addresses the failure of steam generator safety relief valve 
coincident with a LOSP transient. State LOSP-18 describes the failure of 
the automatic plant responses to the transient that could lead to eventual 
degradation of the reactor core. 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The application of probabilistic risk assessment methodology to the 
evaluation of the availability of the emergency power system (EPS) to 
perform its design function has been successfully demonstrated in this 
study. The comprehensive qualitative and quantitative assessment of 
system availability using a reliability block diagram (RED) model and 
fault tree logic provides important conclusions about the reliability of 
the EPS during a loss of offsite power (LOSP) transient. The operator 
action event tree (OAET) analysis provides a systematic identification 
of thermal-hydraulic responses of the principal nuclear reactor systems 
to the LOSP initiator and the relevant operator actions to mitigate the 
effects of the abnormal conditions. 
A. Conclusions 
Based on the system reliability analysis, the following conclusions 
can be stated: 
1. Using data from the Reactor Safety Study (RSS), the reliability 
of the 4.16-kV ESF bus based on the RED model for hardware 
failures only was assessed to be 0.999969. This value trans­
lates into the probability of 4.16-kV bus unavailability per 
-5 demand as 3.1x10 . The RSS assessment of insufficient power to 
the 4.16-kV ESF bus on a single demand yields a probability of 
unavailability as 4.1x10 However, this RSS assessment in­
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corporated human errors in addition to hardware faults in the 
quantitative analysis using fault tree logic. 
The quantitative assessment using fault tree logic in this study 
shows that the estimated probabilities of 4.16-kV bus unavail-
-4 -3 
ability per demand are 5.88x10 and 2.08x10 for the weekly 
and monthly testing of diesel generators respectively. These 
estimates are orders of magnitude higher than the probability of 
unavailability assessed in the RSS. The results of the study 
here indicate that the weekly testing interval for diesel genera­
tor operability contributes to an increased availability of the 
4.16-kV ESF bus on a single demand. 
The quantitative analysis of the system fault tree shows that 
human errors in commission or omission contribute significantly 
to overall unavailability of the 4.16-kV bus. The predominant 
human errors in commission involve the operation of "system-
critical" components such as the circuit breakers connecting the 
feeders from the various power sources to the 4.16-kV bus. 
The fault tree analysis shows that the dominant cause of insuf­
ficient power from the diesel generator system is failure of the 
emergency diesel generator to continue operating after a success­
ful start and load acceptance. The short-term operational un­
reliability of the diesel generator after a successful start can 
be attributed to dirty fuel oil filters, lack of lubrication, 
failed bearings and "dry starts" of the diesel generators. 
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These circumstances are all related to poor maintenance, which is 
another sort of failure, but one that was not specifically ad­
dressed in this study. 
5. The availability, of the dc power system to provide sufficient 
control power required to operate the "system-critical" circuit 
breaker (14-3AS) depends on the reliability of the power sup­
plies, viz., the station batteries. Since the probability of 
failure of dc power supplies is very small, the availability of 
sufficient control power to actuate the circuit breaker after a. 
LOSP initiator represents a very small contribution to the 4.16-
kV ESF bus unavailability. 
6. The availability of normal ac power to 4.16-kV ESF bus is 
susceptible to operator errors in the premature transfer of 
the circuit breaker (1-2A) connecting the feeder to the connect­
ing bus 2A. The loss of ac power is primarily caused by the 
main generator outage which contributes quite significantly to 
overall 4.16-kV ESF bus unavailability. 
7. The availability of offsite power on demand is vulnerable to 
operator errors during the manual operation of the motor-operated 
disconnect (EDS-A) which connects the switching station to the 
startup transformers. The loss of power from the 230-kV grid 
also contributes to the overall 4.16-kV ESF bus unavailability. 
From the OAET analysis that identified the various plant states that 
Ive from the LOSP transient, the following observations can be stated: 
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1. The state LOSP-1 corresponds to the "basic PWR transient 
response" where all the safety functions are maintained by 
automatic actuation of the plant protection system. This state 
is applicable to.most transient initiators except that the 
automatic reactor coolant pump (RCP) trip is typical for the 
LOS? initiator. However, the availability of the RCPs does not 
have a significant impact on the behavior of process variables 
such as pressure, temperature and fluid level in the primary and 
secondary systems. 
2. State LOSP-12 and the plant states 13-16 that evolve from it are 
equivalent to the TMLB'^ accident sequence addressed in the RSS. 
This sequence involves the loss of offsite power initiator coin­
cident with the subsequent failure of both diesel generators. 
3. State LOSP-1 and the plant states 9-11 that evolve from it are 
equivalent to the TML^ accident sequence addressed in the RSS. 
This sequence involves the loss of main feedwater initiator 
coupled with the failure of the emergency feedwater system. 
4. The plant states LOSP-5 and LOSP-8 in the OAET addresses the 
TMLQ^ sequence that occurred at the TMI-2 nuclear facility. This 
sequence involves the loss of both main and emergency feedwater 
compounded by a stuck-open pressurizer valve. 
5. The OAET shows that the availability of the diesel generators is 
significant throughout the accident progression. Emergency ac 
^The notations TMLB', TML and TMLQ are nomenclature for specific PWR 
transient sequences identified by these names in the RSS. 
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power is essential for the actuation of the safeguards equipment 
to prevent core uncovering. 
The reliability analysis of the 4.16-kV ESF bus in this study shows 
that the overall system unavailability is significantly higher than the 
RSS assessment. The updated failure probabilities for the human errors 
and the various hardware faults account for these less optimistic results. 
The significant contributors to overall system unavailability are; diesel 
generator operability problems, particularly those associated with longer 
testing intervals; and human errors during the manual actuation of 
"system-critical" components. The low failure probability of the dc power 
system does not contribute strongly to maintaining overall system avail­
ability on demand. 
Since the dominant contributor to the system availability is diesel 
generator operability on demand, a higher level of redundancy for emergen­
cy ac power can be provided by a "swing" diesel generator. The "swing" 
diesel generator can be aligned to the ESF bus upon a priority demand 
signal that arises from operability fault of the dedicated diesel genera­
tor. A viable option for increased system availability is to replace the 
emergency diesel generator with a more reliable source of ac power such as 
the gas turbine generator. This is also a cost-effective measure because 
the gas turbine generator provides added generating capacity when there is 
no demand for emergency power supply. 
The OAET analysis in this study has identified the risk-significant 
accident sequences, viz., TMLB*, TML and TMLQ which involve failures of 
the diesel generator system and feedwater delivery. The analysis also 
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shows that the delivery of emergency feedwater to the steam generators 
is critically dependent on the availability of the diesel generators. 
The likelihood of these accident sequences can be minimized by an alter­
nate source of emergency feedwater independent of the existing motor-
driven and turbine-driven systems. 
Finally, the relevant operator responses to the various plant condi­
tions identified in the OAET provide valuable lessons in an operator 
training program to mitigate the consequences of transient initiators. 
Operator training should stress the unique role of the individual in 
performing the necessary actions to retard the progression of an accident. 
Enhanced operator performance contributes significantly to overall system 
reliability and plant availability. 
B. Recommendations 
The system reliability analysis presented in this study was based on 
a point-estimate assessment for a one-hour interval upon a single demand 
to perform the system mission. The OAET is a qualitative treatment of 
the thermal-hydraulic responses to the transient initiator. The following 
are recommendations for future work related to this study: 
1. Collect data of unscheduled outages of the nuclear plant due to 
transmission grid instabilities for a plant specific estimate of 
the probability of the LOSP frequency. The plant specific 
estimate contributes to better statistical accuracy in the 
analysis, and identifies plants for which the problem is most 
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serious. The plant specific estimate, being based on a single 
set of design parameters, has less uncertainty than a generic 
number. 
Incorporate error factors in the reliability analysis to account 
for the uncertainty band surrounding every point estimate of a 
demand failure of a component. This provides the determination 
of system unavailability on a random variable basis. However, 
computer programs (e.g, SAMPLE-A, SPASM, etc.) using Monte Carlo 
random sampling techniques or other variance-estimating tech­
niques, are required to obtain the distributions for the 
component failure estimates as input to the evaluation of the 
distribution of overall system unavailability. 
Investigate the system unavailability for various time intervals, 
e.g., 4, 8 and 24 hours after event initiation, to assess time-
dependent effects of the transient initiator. 
Identify the core status and containment failure modes by means 
of containment damage and containment event trees. These event 
tree analyses identify the significant paths of radioactive 
release to the environment for the accident sequence. The iden­
tification of the significant release paths facilitates the 
estimation of fractional core inventory release to the environ­
ment during the course of the postulated accident. 
Identify the key symptoms exhibited ±n the various plant states 
of the OAET so as to produce diagnostic algorithms. The 
diagnosis of key symptoms facilitates the development of improved 
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emergency procedures and the evaluation of plant instrumentation 
requirements. 
95 
IX. REFERENCES 
1. Reactor Safety Study - An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. 
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants» WASH-1400 (NUREG - 75/014). U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., 1975. 
2. D. C. Wood. Using Event Trees to Quantify the Effect of Post-TMI 
Modifications on PORV-Related LOCA Problems. Proceedings of ANS/ENS 
Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Risk Assessment ^ (VIB), 1141-1150 
(September, 1981). 
3. N. J. McConnick. Reliability and Risk Analysis; Methods and Nuclear 
Power Applications. Academic Press, New York, 1981. 
4. D. Okrent. Nuclear Reactor Safety. The University of Wisconsin 
Press, Madison, Wisconsin, 1981. 
5. Analysis of Three Mile Island - Unit 2 Accident. Nuclear Safety 
Analysis Center Report. Electric Power Research Institute, Palo 
Alto, California. July, 1979. 
6. F. L. Leverenz, G. McLagan and A. M. Azarm. Station Blackout; A 
Preliminary Assessment. SAI-102-81-AM, Report to NSAC. Electric 
Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, California. February, 1980. 
7. W. E. Vesely. Failure Data and Risk Analysis. ANS Proceedings; 
Probabilistic Analysis of Nuclear Reactor Safety 2» (VI) 1.1-1.12 
(May 1978). 
8. B. B. Chu and D. P. Gaver. Availability Analysis for Some Standby 
Systems. ANS Proceedings; Probabilistic Analysis of Nuclear Reactor 
Safety 2, (VI) 8.1-8.14 (May, 1978). 
9. A. Pages, M. Gondran and B. Magnon. Evaluation of the Reliability 
and the Availability of Large Repairable Systems by the Method of 
Critical Running States. ANS Proceedings; Probabilistic Analysis of 
Nuclear Reactor Safety 3, (VIII) 2.1-2.12 (May, 1978). 
10. A. M. Azarm, G. McLagan, A. Husseiny and M. Metwally. Assessment of 
Diesel Generator Reliability in Light-Water Reactors. Am. Nu'c. Soc. 
Transactions 353-395 (November, 1980) . 
11. J. K. Vaurio. Availability Analysis of Standby Safety System. Pro­
ceedings of ANS/ENS Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
1 (IVC), 707-716 (September, 1981). 
96 
12. T. Mankamo and U. Pulkkinen. Dependent Failures of Diesel Genera­
tors. Nuclear Safety 23(1), 32-40 (January, 1982). 
13. D. G. Eisenhut. Reliability of P.O. Power Supplies in Nuclear Power 
Plant Application. ANS Proceedings: Probabilistic Analysis of 
Nuclear Reactor Safety 3, (XII) 8.1-8.10 (May, 1978). 
14. E. W. Hagen. Technical Note; A Probabilistic Safety Analysis of DC 
Power Supply Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants. Nuclear Safety 
^(1), 40-43 (January, 1982). 
15. K. N. Fleming and P. H. Raabe. A Comparison of Three Methods for 
the Quantitltative Analysis of Common Causé Failures. ANS Pro­
ceedings: Probabilistic Analysis of Nuclear Reactor Safety (X) 
3.1-3.12 (May, 1978). 
16. R. G. Easterllng. Probabilistic Analysis of Common Mode Failures. 
ANS Proceedings; Probabilistic Analysis of Nuclear Reactor Safety _3, 
(X) 7.1-7.12 (May, 1978). 
17. J. A. Steverson and C. L. Atwood. Common Cause Failure Rate 
Estimates for Diesel Generators in Nuclear Power Plants. Proceedings 
of ANS/ENS Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Risk Assessment 2 (IVB), 
659-665 (September, 1981). 
18. F. E. Raskin, W. B. Murfin, J. B. Rlvard and J. L. Darby. Analysis 
of a Hypothetical Core Meltdown Accident Initiated by Loss of 
Offaite Power for the Zion "1 Pressurized Water Reactor. Sandia 
Report (NUREG/CR-1988). Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, 
New Mexico. December, 1981. 
19. J. B. Fussell, J. S. Arendt, W. K. Crowley, D. P. Wagner, J. J. 
Rooney and D. J. Campbell. Improving System-Safety through Risk 
Assessment. Proceedings in 1979 Annual Reliability & Maintainabil­
ity Symposium, 1979, 160-163 (January, 1979). 
20. Y. G. Rosen and L. N. Nyh. Availability Study of Forsmark 3 Nuclear 
Power Plant. Proceedings in 1980 Annual Reliability & Maintainabil­
ity Symposium, 1980, 70-75 (January, 1980). 
21. H. Hoertner. Review on the Present Status of the German Risk Study-
Plant Design Analysis. Proceedings of ANS/ENS Topical Meeting on 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment ^  (VIIB), 1334-1341 (September, 1981). 
22. E. J. Henley and H. Kumamoto. Reliability Engineering and Risk 
Assessment. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1981. 
23. M. L. Shooman. Probabilistic Reliability; An Engineering Approach. 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1968. 
97 
24. Waterford 3 System Descriptions - AC Power Systems (SD-56). 
Louisiana Power and Light Company, Killona, Louisiana, 1982. 
25. Waterford 3 System Descriptions - DC Power Distribution System (SD-
58). Louisiana Power and Light Company, Killona, Louisiana, 1982. 
26. Status Summary Reports for U.S. Licensed Operating Reactors (NUREG-
0020). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., 
January, 1980 to November, 1982. 
27. J. P. Poloski and W. H. Sullivan. Data Summaries of Licensee Event 
Reports of Diesel Generators at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power 
Plants. EG&G Idaho Report (NUREG/CR-1362), Idaho Falls, Idaho, 
March, 1980. 
A. Additional References 
R. G. Brown, J. L. vonHerrmann and Y. F. Quilliam. Operator Action 
Event Trees for the Zion 1 Pressurized Water Reactor. EG&G Idaho 
Report (NUREG/CR-2888), Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Idaho 
Falls, Idaho. September, 1982. 
Emergency Operating Procedure; Loss of AC Power. Waterford 3 Plant 
Operating Manual 6(1), 1-12 (December, 1981). 
PRA Procedures Guide - A Guide to the Performance of Probabilistic Risk 
Assessments for Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG/CR-2300). U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., January, 1983. 
Waterford 3 Final Safety Analysis Report - Chapter 15(2). Louisiana 
Power and Light Company, Killona, Louisiana, 1982. 
S. M. Wong. Lecture Notes on AC Electrical Distribution for Waterford 3 
General Systems Training Program. Louisiana Power and Light 
Company, Killona, Louisiana, 1983 (unpublished). 
S. M. Wong. Lecture Notes on DC Power System for Waterford 3 General 
Systems Training Program. Louisiana Power and Light Company, 
Killona, Louisiaia, 1983 (unpublished). 
98 
X. ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
Thanks be to God for His Grace and Blessings that this work reached 
its fruition. 
The author expresses his sincere appreciation and gratitude to his 
major professors. Dr. Bernard I. Spinrad and Dr. Aly A. Mahmoud, for 
their useful discussions and guidance they provided throughout the 
preparation of this dissertation. In addition, the author expresses his 
special thanks to Dr. Randy L. Hagenson of the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, New Mexico, for his constant encouragement and moral support 
under trying circumstances. Also, acknowledgment and a note of appreci­
ation is due Dr. Zeinab A. Sabri of Louisiana Power and Light Company, 
who served initially as co-major professor. 
Finally, the author dedicates this dissertation to the members of 
his immediate family in Malaysia. He also acknowledges the sincere and 
wonderful friendship of professional colleagues and operations personnel 
at the Waterford 3 Nuclear Plant during his sojourn as an onsite 
consultant in the Training Department of Louisiana Power and Light 
Company, Killona, Louisiana. 
99 
XI. APPENDIX. MONTHLY DATA OF FORCED OUTAGES FOR U.S. NUCLEAR 
POWER PLANTS IN COMMERCIAL OPERATION 
Month Forced Outages Operating Units Outage/Operating Unit 
Jan. 1980 44 66 0.667 
Feb. 1980 58 66 0.879 
Mar. 1980 52 67 0.776 
Apr. 1980 57 67 0.851 
May 1980 61 67 0.910 
Jun. 1980 65 67 0.970 
Jul. 1980 64 67 0.955 
Aug. 1980 71 66 0.930 
Sep. 1980 60 66 0.909 
Oct. 1980 52 66 0.788 
Nov. 1980 62 66 0.939 
Dec. 1980 61 67 0.910 
Jan. 1981 49 67 0.731 
Feb. 1981 55 67 0.821 
Mar. 1981 58 67 0.866 
Apr. 1981 59 67 0.881 
May 1981 47 67 0.701 
Jun. 1981 71 67 1.060 
Jul. 1981 81 69 1.174 
Aug. 1981 81 69 1.174 
Sep. 1981 44 69 0.638 
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Month Forced Outages Operating Units Outage/Operating Unit 
Oct. 1981 69 70 0.986 
Nov. 1981 56 70 0.800 
Dec. 1981 67 70 0.957 
Jan. 1982 83 71 1.169 
Feb. 1982 56 71 0.789 
Mar. 1982 52 71 0.732 
Apr. 1982 72 71 1.014 
May 1982 50 71 0.704 
Jun. 1982 50 72 0.694 
Jul. 1982 59 72 0.819 
Aug. 1982 64 72 0.889 
Sep. 1982 59 72 0.819 
Oct. 1982 51 72 0.708 
Nov. 1982 40 72 0.556 
Average Forced Outage per Operating Unit in a Month = 0.862 
Estimated Failure (Tripout) Rate of Main Generator = 1.159x10 ^/hr 
